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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
his report investigates whether and how the EU might, in its policies 
towards Russia, the Eastern partner countries and Central Asia, build 
stronger common programmes and projects across these three 
political ‘spaces’. The aim would be to secure synergies between actions 
that are presently segmented between these three spaces, and especially to 
induce Russia to become a genuinely cooperative positive-sum-game 
player in the wider European neighbourhood, rather than to continue its 
efforts to rebuild the former Soviet Union space as its sphere of influence. 
It has to be emphasised at the outset that this is both a major strategic 
objective and an extremely difficult challenge. Russia’s political mind-set 
and actual policies in recent times have clearly given priority to rebuilding 
its would-be sphere of influence. The political values and activities of the 
European Union are seen by Russia as a threat both at home, with risks of 
contagion from the colour revolutions, and in the East European 
neighbourhood where the EU appears as a competing and expansionist 
actor. At the same time Russia is itself quite widely viewed in the EU as a 
threat as much as a partner, especially in the aftermath of the August 2008 
war in Georgia and the two successive interruptions in 2006 and 2009 of 
gas supplies transiting Ukraine.  
Moreover, Russia, Ukraine and other countries of the region have for 
different political reasons a sharp aversion to anything that would make 
them feel they were all ‘in the same box’ in EU foreign policies. The latest 
development of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), with the 
proposed regional-multilateral dimension to the Eastern Partnership (EaP), 
could harden the compartmentalisation of the EU’s policies between the 
Eastern region and Russia. The institutional arrangements now being 
proposed for the EaP’s regional-multilateral activities have provisions for 
its possible extension to third countries such as Russia and Turkey, but the 
terms being proposed for this suggest an uncertain and ad hoc association.  
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Political framework – a Pan-European Dimension 
A strategy by the EU to engineer a change in outlook and behaviour on the 
part of Russia, and also to overcome the suspicions and hostilities towards 
Russia in a number of East European states, would have to be built upon a 
substantial set of actions that would deliver clear and concrete benefits, 
going beyond bureaucratic refinements of EU programmes. Otherwise, a 
marginal effort employing token instruments would carry no realistic 
expectation of strategic results.  
The political framework for such an initiative could be constructed by 
adapting and building upon current initiatives and tendencies in EU 
policies towards the wider European area.  
The EU’s new Eastern Partnership initiative could prove pivotal in 
this regard, notably as regards its multilateral-regional aspect. The 
Commission proposed that third countries such as Russia and Turkey 
“could be included an ad hoc basis”. On 19-20 March 2009, the European 
Council adopted a somewhat more open formulation. Inclusion of both 
Russia and Turkey could be generally welcomed, but subject to a degree of 
‘variable geometry’ flexibility depending on the specific actions. The 
possible inclusion of Russia and Turkey in this multilateral-regional 
framework will in any case be without prejudice to the specific nature of 
the bilateral relations that the EU has with each EaP state, or for that matter 
Russia as strategic partner and Turkey as candidate state. A generally open 
position could also facilitate the EU’s inclusion in the Caucasus Stability 
Platform recently launched by Turkey, which so far includes Russia but not 
the EU.  
With these adjustments to the Commission’s proposal, the way 
would be open to rationalise the Black Sea Synergy initiative with the 
regional-multilateral dimension of the Eastern Partnership, thus 
eliminating a source of potential confusion.  
The option of ad hoc third country inclusion in this Eastern 
Partnership activity could also be reserved for one or more Central Asian 
states, depending on the topic, noting for example Kazakhstan’s ‘Path to 
Europe’ initiative. In addition the emerging economic and security links 
between Europe via Central Asia through to South and East Asia become 
new horizons for European and Asian policy-makers. This should mean an 
important evolution in the approach of the EU’s Central Asia strategy: the 
region should be considered not so much as the EU’s outer periphery (or 
‘neighbours of the neighbours’ in the words of some EU documents) but 
rather as a strategic bridge between Europe and China. SYNERGIES VS. SPHERES OF INFLUENCE IN THE PAN-EUROPEAN SPACE | 3 
To give a firmer political framework to this initiative we use the term 
‘Pan-European Dimension’ to mean cooperative actions between the EU 
and cross-regional groupings between Russia, Eastern Partners and Central 
Asian states; involving the EU either with states from each of these three 
‘spaces’, or from at least two of them.1 There would be ‘variable geometry’ 
in the participation of specific actions. Actions involving the EU and states 
for just one other of the ‘spaces’ would be handled under the bilateral 
relations between the EU and the states concerned, or the EaP, or Central 
Asia strategy. These arrangements would be preferable to the hypothesis of 
extending the activity to the entire CIS space, which would encounter 
various political objections. 
The EU has become highly creative in devising ‘regional dimensions’ 
in its relations with different parts of its wider neighbourhood. The 
Northern Dimension is the case that uses this term, yet the Union for the 
Mediterranean, Eastern Partnership, Black Sea Synergy, Central Asia 
strategy and recent Arctic initiative are all variants on this theme.  
What has so far been missing is a Pan-European Dimension, targeting 
actions that optimally overarch several regions or spaces. It would not be 
necessary or desirable to create a new institutional structure for the Pan-
European Dimension. However it would be open for any state, or group of 
states to advance proposals for consideration, and to be explored in 
bilateral meetings with the EU, as well in the framework of the regional-
multilateral component of the Eastern Partnership.  
The functional utility of a Pan-European Dimension has of course to 
be demonstrated. With this in mind the larger part of the present report 
reviews a set of possible ‘flagship projects’ in the economic, energy, climate 
change, civil society and security domains. The political case for the EU to 
explore the potential of such an initiative at the present time is clear 
enough. There is an urgent need for confidence-building measures 
especially between the EU, Russia and the Eastern Partner states in the 
aftermath of the war in Georgia, the Ukraine gas crisis and the global 
economic crisis. There is a need to develop the Eastern Partnership, but also 
to avoid its becoming a source of greater compartmentalisation of Europe. 
There is a need to respond constructively to President Medvedev’s call for a 
pan-European security architecture, which so far is conspicuously lacking 
                                                      
1 Possible combinations include: EU-Russia-EaP-CA, EU-Russia-EaP, EU-EaP-CA 
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in concrete substance coming from either Russia or the EU. There is a need 
for a political framework to bring together a substantial set of ‘flagship 
actions’ as a coherent strategic initiative in order to secure economic and 
political synergetic benefits. 
On how such a Pan-European Dimension might be initiated, there is 
no reason to depart from the EU’s regular procedure: the European Council 
might invite the Commission to draw up a Communication on the subject 
within a reasonable delay such as six months. However the proposed 
adjustment of the formula for participation in the regional-multilateral part 
of the Eastern Partnership would best be prepared in time for the 
forthcoming official launch of the EaP at a summit meeting in May 2009.  
Flagship projects 
With this in mind, the present report examines various sectors of policy for 
the opportunities that they might present for cooperative action between 
the EU, Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The list is selective, but 
also fairly exhaustive in that it is hard to think of other policy sectors that 
could offer more promising potential for the purpose at hand.  
1.  Trade. The idea of a Pan-European Economic Space is a first candidate 
for consideration because it can be based on strong existing EU 
competences; moreover there is currently momentum in favour of 
extending the EU’s network of free trade agreements in the European 
neighbourhood. Negotiations for Deep Free Trade Agreements (DFTA) 
are underway or envisaged with the Eastern partners, and the idea of a 
Common European Economic Space has often featured in political 
discourse. In addition, the Commission has expressed its interest in a 
FTA with Russia. But here there is a blockage, first with Russia’s failure 
yet to join the WTO, with opposition within Russia to an FTA with the 
EU, which some consider would mainly be to the EU’s advantage. The 
current global recession is intensifying Russian protectionist tendencies 
(e.g. already for cars). The counter-argument is that Russia’s economic 
policy is failing to develop a diversified and competitive industrial 
economy, and that at some point trade liberalisation with the EU will 
need to be part of the remedial therapy. 
2.  Transport.  The pan-European transport infrastructure and networks 
have been the subjects of intensive planning for almost two decades, 
with the successful (consensual) identification of priority axes or 
corridors. Relatively large sums are being invested by the EU 
institutions and national governments in the intra-EU networks. Their SYNERGIES VS. SPHERES OF INFLUENCE IN THE PAN-EUROPEAN SPACE | 5 
extension beyond the EU into Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
progresses much less quickly, due to lesser funding and various 
bureaucratic and political obstacles. A new development is seen in 
plans for Eurasian land connections with corridors stretching East from 
Central Asia supported by the Asian Development Bank, which could 
be linked to EU supported projects. The recently decided extension of 
the European Investment Bank’s mandate to operations in Central Asia 
will be helpful in this context.  
3.  Energy. For the purpose of the present study, seeking synergies from 
cooperative projects between the EU, Russia, Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia, the gas pipeline network options are of inescapable 
importance. There are now five major pipelines, actual or planned, that 
come into play: the two main land routes from Russia transiting 
through Ukraine and Belarus, the Nord and South Stream projects that 
would avoid transit countries before reaching the EU, and the 
Nabucco/Southern Corridor being promoted by the EU. Of these a 
reconfiguration of the Ukrainian trunk pipeline, with a long-term 
concession leased to a tripartite (EU-RUS-UKR) consortium, could offer 
outstanding economic and political benefits. The Nabucco/Southern 
Corridor plans also open up tripartite (EU, Eastern Europe, Central 
Asia) cooperative possibilities, which could conceivably become 
quadripartite if Russia accepted the offer to join.  
4.  Water-hydro-energy-food crisis in Central Asia. Since the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, cooperative management of the water, hydro-electric 
and irrigation resources of Central Asia has catastrophically broken 
down, resulting in growing humanitarian distress in upstream 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan through lack of winter heating, and in 
downstream Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan through water shortages for 
agriculture. The resulting internal and intra-state tensions are growing, 
and could lead to open conflicts. The alert is being sounded by 
international agencies, but to little effect. The EU cannot itself become 
the main architect of a solution, but it could help shape a coalition of all 
major actors to this end, and use its weight in the board of the World 
Bank to advocate a more pro-active approach.  
5.  Climate change. Three countries – Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan – 
are especially heavy polluters, particularly through their use of coal and 
obsolete energy-using technologies. They will resist inclusion in the 
group of advanced countries making ambitious and binding 
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the end of 2009. However the EU could propose a collaborative action 
with these three countries together setting up a Quadripartite Climate 
Change Dialogue, Concretely this could assist the development of 
national Emissions Trading Schemes, and the amplification of 
conventional energy efficiency and saving programmes, leading on to 
collaborative projects for carbon capture and storage (CCS) pilot 
projects. 
6.  Border management. The EU and its member states are already active 
in the field of border management in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 
The challenges in Central Asia, with the drug trails from Afghanistan, 
are especially daunting. The main EU efforts are in the Border 
Management Programme for Central Asia (BOMCA) mission, which 
however is operated by UNDP, with a lack of EU visibility. Detailed 
proposals are made below for the EU to establish regional border 
assistance centres in Central Asia and the Caucasus, with funds to 
amplify operations, and openings for Russia and third parties to join in.  
7.  Conflict resolution and civil emergencies. The conflict resolution and 
prevention agenda in East European states is an obvious candidate in 
theory for EU-Russian collaboration, together with the interested third 
states directly concerned (in the South Caucasus, Transnistria and 
Crimea). Russia has taken the view, however, that the perpetuation of 
these conflicts was in its tactical geo-political interest, until and unless 
circumstances such as the August war with Georgia presented the 
opportunity for decisive ‘victory’. However this policy has contributed 
heavily to Russia’s poor reputation in European affairs. In the 
hypothesis of this paper, Russia might be induced to change this stance, 
and join with the EU in genuine conflict resolution and prevention 
efforts, in which case there could be a remarkable turnaround in favour 
of cooperative outcomes. A Pan-European Civil Emergencies Facility is 
also proposed. 
8.  Civil society and political development. A set of three networks in the 
broad civil society and public policy field illustrates how it is possible 
to organise politically sensitive activity overarching the former Soviet 
bloc, from Eastern Europe to Central Asia. These networks are plausible 
candidates for stronger support by the EU, member states and 
European private international foundations. The sums suggested, 
totalling €25 million for all three networks, would mean a substantial 
increase in present funding, but these are not large sums in relation to 
total resources available under the European Neighbourhood and SYNERGIES VS. SPHERES OF INFLUENCE IN THE PAN-EUROPEAN SPACE | 7 
Partnership Instrument (ENPI), the funding instrument of the EU’s 
European Neighbourhood Policy.  
9.  Pan-European security. President Medvedev has proposed a new pan-
European security architecture, which sounds promising at first sight. 
However the credibility of Russia’s intentions has been undermined by 
its behaviour in the war with Georgia and its recognition of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia. While the Medvedev speeches have not so far 
referred to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE), whose ‘Helsinki principles’ must serve as the normative 
foundations of any such architecture, it is positive that discussions are 
now taking place within OSCE fora. The EU and NATO are reflecting 
on how to respond. The EU might respond by taking steps itself to 
reinforce the OSCE: first, for the EU (post-Lisbon) to become a full 
member of the OSCE; and second, in order to limit the heavy 
constraints of meetings of all 56 member states, for it to test the ground 
for possible core group meetings (e.g. tripartite EU-Rus-US). As and 
when confidence has been improved between the parties, to propose 
consideration of a new European Security Council which would be a 
core group of major players within the OSCE (this could be a variant on 
a long-standing request from Moscow). 
10. Other pan-European multilateralism. The several pan-European 
multilateral organisations should in principle be supporting 
cooperation between all parties. Of the existing organisations only the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has 
established an important niche activity that all parties, including 
Russia, seem content to work with. On the other hand, Russia seeks to 
marginalise or ignore other organisations that should be serving key 
functions (especially the Energy Charter Treaty and the OSCE), while 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and 
Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) find it difficult to sustain or 
build significant roles. Both the OSCE and BSEC could see their role in 
economic affairs enhanced by several of the proposals discussed here. 
The recent gas crisis poses the question whether should be fresh 
negotiations over revision or enhancement of the Energy Charter 
Treaty. 
11. The global financial and economic crisis. The financial and economic 
crisis is deepening in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, which sees 
Russia rushing in with financial aid to several countries of the region, 
alongside interventions by the IMF, with the EU deciding also to 8 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
augment the financial instruments that it can deploy. All this makes a 
case for coordinated responses in cases such as Ukraine, including 
conditionalities, in order to avoid inconsistent actions and to secure 
synergetic benefits. Such coordination between Russia on the one hand, 
and the IMF, EU and the countries concerned on the other, is not yet 
happening. Perhaps initiatives along these lines could be engineered. 
Conclusions 
The current global financial and economic crisis might lead to a rethink in 
Russia over its strategic attitudes, to which President Obama’s newly 
declared wish for a fresh start with Russia may also contribute. No longer 
under the delusion of ‘holding all the cards’, Russia may become more 
open to propositions of cooperation of the type discussed in this paper. But 
that certainly cannot be taken for granted. While the hypothetical actions 
reviewed in this report objectively offer possibilities for improving the 
status quo, almost all of them would currently encounter political obstacles 
for their realisation. The tantalising idea is that the current crisis might 
become the tipping point to set in motion a change of strategic attitudes 
and thence a cascade of cooperative actions of the kinds outlined in this 
report.  
The incentives offered to Russia lie first in the intrinsic value of a 
series of concrete economic and security projects. The overall Pan-
European Dimension would provide a political framework of bilateral and 
regional-multilateral relations in line with Russia’s aspirations to play a 
leading role in the wider Europe. Developments along these lines would 
also reinvigorate the bilateral EU-Russia relationship, and provide a 
favourable context in which to conclude an ambitious new agreement to 
succeed the Partnership Cooperation Agreement (PCA). 
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Summary of flagship projects for cross-regional cooperation 
in the Pan-European Space 
-  Pan-European free trade area 
-  Coordination of EU-Rus-IFIs macro-financial assistance in Eastern 
Europe 
-  Extension of European Investment Bank mandate to Central Asia 
(initiated) 
-  Pan-European transport corridors to link from Central to East & 
South Asia 
-  Tripartite Ukr-EU-Rus corporate restructuring of Ukraine transit 
pipeline 
-  Cooperative rationalisation of Nabucco/Southern Corridor/South 
Stream 
-  CA-Rus-EU-IFIs cooperation over Central Asian water/hydro power 
nexus 
-  Quadripartite EU-Rus-Ukr-Kazak climate change dialogue 
-  Quadripartite EU-Rus-Ukr-Kazak carbon capture and storage pilot 
projects,  
-  EU border management projects in Central Asia and the Caucasus, 
with Russia 
-  EU-Rus Civil Emergencies Cooperation Framework for Pan-
European Space 
-  EU and private foundations to strengthen pan-European civil society 
networks 
-  Reform of OSCE as key to pan-European security architecture  
 
 
 
 
PART I 
PRINCIPLES AND PARADIGMS 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
he subject of this study is the pursuit of coherence and possible 
synergies in EU policies towards Russia, the Eastern neighbourhood 
states and Central Asia. These three ‘dimensions’ are currently 
subject to EU policies that have quite a lot in common, but are nonetheless 
in separate policy-making categories.  
The question is whether the effectiveness of these policies could be 
enhanced by bringing them closer together in various operational ways. 
These sets of EU neighbourhood policies are differentiated for clear 
political reasons, yet there is a strong thread of commonality among them 
based on the EU’s operational tools and political values.  
The strategic issue is over what paradigm of international relations 
may or should prevail across this vast region, as between two models:  
-  A space increasingly and clearly divided between EU and Russian 
spheres of influence, with more competition and tensions than 
cooperation over the common East European neighbourhood and 
Central Asia. 
-  A space where all parties come to see the advantages of wide-ranging 
cooperation at least in economic and security spheres, if not also in 
the political sphere. The parties would effectively obtain synergetic 
benefits from multiple cooperative endeavours. 
The position of the EU is to work towards this second model, 
whereas the Russian leadership is more heavily oriented towards the first. 
Is it possible to develop the EU policy agenda in such a way as to induce 
Russia to see greater advantage in this second desired model?  
The background on the EU side is seen in several  policy 
developments, including: the opening of negotiations with Russia over a 
successor to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), efforts to 
strengthen the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) with the Eastern 
Partnership (EaP), and the Central Asia strategy. In addition there are 
several more limited regional initiatives: the Black Sea Synergy, the 
Northern Dimension and the new Commission paper on the Arctic region.  
T 12 | INTRODUCTION 
The political context has of course been greatly sharpened by the 
combination of the August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia, the 
renewed breakdown in gas transit through Ukraine in January 2009 and the 
effects of the global financial and economic crisis.  
In our pursuit of coherence and possible synergies in EU policies 
towards Russia, we have assembled concrete information on sectors of 
policy, projects and institutional arrangements that may offer potential for 
multi-regional cooperation in the various possible combinations: all four 
(EU-Rus-EaP-CA) together, as well as the three-way combinations (EU-
Rus-EaP), (EU-Rus-CA) and (EU-EaP-CA).  
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2.  THE CLASH OF PARADIGMS 
hile the bulk of this paper addresses mechanisms of EU policy at 
a concrete and relatively technical level, the link to the 
overarching strategic purpose has to be kept in perspective. The 
overarching issue is ‘the Russia question’, and in particular how to induce 
Russia to come closer to Europe’s worldview and normative conception of 
the wider European area,2 and to build a better such convergence with 
concrete processes and projects of cooperation.  
The contemporary European (EU) view of itself corresponds to what 
the international relations literature calls ‘European international society’, 
which has been defined as: 
when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and 
common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive 
themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations 
with each other, and share in the working of common institutions.3 
This is a fair description of the EU-centred Europe, but not one in 
which today’s Russia could be recognised. Russia has for centuries been 
struggling to define itself in relation to Europe. While there have been some 
phases, from Peter the Great to the early post-Soviet period, when Russia 
attempted to converge on European norms, these have proved to be thin 
and short-lived. The dominant historical picture is one of Russia perceiving 
itself as a great power that sets its own norms and controls its own imperial 
space. These characteristics were seen during various Tsarist regimes and 
then in their most extreme form, especially in terms of an own normative 
                                                      
2 An excellent survey of the ideational bases and contradictions in the Russia-EU 
relationship is by Hiski Haukala, “Multi-causal Social Mechanisms and the Study 
of International Institutionalisation: The Case of the EU-Russia Strategic 
Partnership”, University of Turku, doctoral dissertation, 2008, Turku. 
3 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1977, 1995. 
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ideology and control of empire, in the Communist period. While the 
Communism has gone, today’s leadership group is still coming 
substantially from the ranks of the Soviet KGB, and exhibits these same 
enduring traits in their approach to European and international affairs.  
Russia is special of course by virtue of its size (the biggest nation in 
Europe) and economic structure (its huge natural resource base), but the 
most relevant characteristic for the present study is its view of itself in 
Europe and the world, which tends to be the categorical opposite of the 
modern (or post-modern) Europe of the European Union. Russia’s 
leadership defines the state as a great power, boasts its military strength as 
a nuclear power (flying strategic bombers to Venezuela last summer) and 
relishing the chance to use its conventional military hardware (as in the 
August war with Georgia). Its military is in fact in large measure greatly 
weakened by the low level of technical quality of its weaponry and by 
dreadful standards of morale and behaviour in the lower ranks (conditions 
for conscripts), but it champions its military strength in annual displays in 
Red Square, and in continuing celebration of the Great Patriotic War. These 
expressions of nationalist patriotism are a key part of the authoritarian 
leadership’s propaganda efforts to justify its own legitimacy, and to cover 
up the grave weaknesses of the economy and social system, and also the 
huge corruption of the ruling class with their increasing control of major 
enterprises.  
Continuing the national discourse, it is further alleged that the West 
exploited Russia’s moment of weakness and humiliated it after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, for example with NATO’s expansion into the former 
Soviet space. Russia engages in an extremely convoluted foreign policy 
discourse, claiming the moral high ground in referring to the ‘illegal’ 
actions of the US (or West) in Kosovo and Iraq, while then quoting the 
Kosovo example as justification for its own recognition of the 
independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.4 It blocks or weakens the 
actions of the OSCE and Council of Europe in the domain of democracy, 
while claiming to have its own model of (‘sovereign’) democracy. It claims 
to be searching for peaceful solutions to the unresolved conflicts of the 
former Soviet space, but operates tactically in all the cases in point 
                                                      
4 For a frank Russian view, see Andrei Makarychev, Russia and its ‘New Security 
Architecture’ in Europe: A Critical Examination of the Concept, CEPS Policy Brief, 
January 2009.  SYNERGIES VS. SPHERES OF INFLUENCE IN THE PAN-EUROPEAN SPACE | 15 
 
(Transnistria, Abkhazia, South-Ossetia, and Nagorno Karabakh) in pursuit 
of manifest realpolitik objectives. It sees opportunities to stir up trouble in 
Crimea; for example Moscow’s ‘vertical of power’ does nothing to restrain 
Mayor Lushkov from inflaming tensions over the Black Sea fleet and 
Sevastopol.  
Russia’s economy has been undergoing bewilderingly huge swings in 
its fortunes, from the initial post-Soviet collapse, to recovery in the mid-
1990s, but then the 1998 financial crash, on to a decade of rapid growth and 
enrichment which culminated in mid-2008 with Russia perceiving itself as 
holding all the cards, while China and the West scrambled for scarce 
mineral resources, followed now in the great 2008-09 global financial and 
economic crisis that is now humbling Russia once again. The strategic 
consequences of the current global crash cannot yet be seen clearly. Yet we 
know that this is the gravest economic crisis since the Great Depression of 
the 1930s, which itself resulted in the advance of the welfare state, the rise 
of fascism, world war, and the post-war order built around the United 
Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions and the birth and growth of 
today’s European Union. The legacy of that first Great Depression took half 
a century to be fully revealed. Is the devastating impact of the current 
global crash going perhaps to shake Russia out of its very old-fashioned 
(19th century) mode of foreign and security policy? At least the context is 
changed drastically, and it may open up opportunities to get Russian 
foreign and security policies onto a fresh track. But there cannot be a 
presumption that this new weakness in Russia will lead Russian policy in 
the direction that Europe would like to see: the old model of economic 
distress inducing leaders to become more populist, nationalist, paranoiac, 
xenophobic, adventurist-militarist and repressive is still there, available for 
use.  
Conclusion: Russia’s urge to restore its position of power in the former 
Soviet space is deeply entrenched in the mindset and intentions of its leadership; 
and certainly much more so than ideas of complex cooperative endeavours with the 
European Union, which it sees as an ambiguous combination of cooperation 
partner and a competitive expansionist threat. The current global economic crisis is 
certainly hitting Russia hard, challenging its recent self-perception of fast-growing 
economic strength, but leaving quite unknown at this stage the possible political 
scenarios, from adoption of a more cooperative stance in international relations to 
an even more populist nationalism, deepening the clash of paradigms. 
Correspondingly, a strategy to induce Russia to switch its outlook and foreign 
policy behaviour closer to what the EU would consider cooperative and congenial is 16 | THE CLASH OF PARADIGMS 
going to need a very substantial set of projects that deliver clear and concrete 
benefits, going way beyond various bureaucratic refinements of EU programmes. 
This will have to be a matter of obtaining strategic leverage with big instruments 
(for scale, the Schmidt-Brezhnev gas pipeline project offers an apt example); 
otherwise, it will be nothing more than a marginal effort employing token 
instruments and carrying no realistic expectation of achieving strategic results. 
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3.  EU POLICIES TOWARDS RUSSIA, 
EASTERN EUROPE, CENTRAL ASIA AND 
REGIONAL DIMENSIONS 
he EU is currently renewing or strengthening its relations with three 
areas – Russia, the Eastern neighbours and Central Asia. All three 
relationships are in a comparatively fluid state at this time, since they 
are at various stages of policy-shaping and negotiation, each with some 
degree of freedom for defining the way ahead. The proposed renewal of the 
EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement finally saw the 
opening of the negotiation process at the end of 2008, after serious 
hesitations and divisions on the EU side whether or on what conditions to 
go ahead, given Russia’s problematic behaviour in the August war with 
Georgia, following several earlier incidents (Estonian monument, Polish 
meat affair, etc.). There have been continuing attempts to strengthen the 
European Neighbourhood Policy without making new commitments to 
membership perspectives, from the efforts of the German Presidency in the 
first half of 2007 through to the current efforts to develop the Eastern 
Partnership (EaP). The Commission Communication of December 2008 on 
the EaP opens up a number of ideas to be weighed in the present context, to 
which we return below. Finally the EU’s new ‘Central Asia Strategy’ was 
launched in the course of 2007-08.  
These three blocks of policy are distinct and separate for quite clear 
reasons. The ENP/EaP states have a core group (Ukraine, Moldova and 
Georgia) that aspire to membership perspectives and so are willing to work 
under the paradigm of convergence on EU norms and standards, and with 
procedures that resemble the accession process (even while the EU 
persistently denies membership perspective requests). Thus the ENP 
Action Plans and Progress Reports are broadly structured according to the 
chapters of the accession process and the Regular Reports on each 
candidate. In addition for Ukraine it has been agreed that the next treaty-
level agreement will be an ‘Association Agreement’. Armenia’s leadership 
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makes speeches with European identity content. Azerbaijan is willing to 
play along with the process, so as not to exclude itself. Belarus increasingly 
appears also interested in joining in, so to have options in relation to 
Russia; and this tendency may now be accentuated following the IMF loan 
to help its economy resist the current crisis.  
Russia on the other hand rejects as a matter of political principle the 
idea of convergence on European norms and standards, although in 
practice this position has ambiguities and contradictions to it. At the 
technical level Russian sectoral ministries and various private sector 
interest groups are often quite open to adopting or drawing on European 
standards where there is a ‘modernisation’ advantage to be obtained. And 
at the political level Russian discourse on controversial foreign and security 
policy issues (Georgia, Kosovo) is heard invoking the same normative 
principles as the EU uses to justify its positions (its actions in Georgia have 
been justified by the precedent set by the EU in Kosovo). Since Russia’s 
principled declarations are subject to such inconsistencies, a more basic 
explanation may be more relevant, namely that Russia as a major power 
does not want to be treated by the EU in the same category as ‘lesser’ 
former Soviet republics, and rejects in particular the idea of political 
conditionalities which some of the ENP/EaP states are willing to 
contemplate. It is evident that both Russia on the one hand, and Ukraine 
and Georgia on the other, each have their own political reasons for wishing 
not to be grouped together in EU policies.  
Finally, the Central Asian states have become increasingly separated 
from the European neighbours in their relations with the EU, in spite of the 
fact that in the early post-Soviet period the EU offered them Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreements on the basis of the model that emerged for 
the European partner states. This happened for a whole set of basic reasons: 
geographical and cultural distance, disinterest in democracy in the region, 
weaker economic integration with the EU, etc. Only recently has the EU 
begun to try a fresh start with its Central Asia Strategy, and only with 
Kazakhstan does there now appear a serious interest in closer relations.  SYNERGIES VS. SPHERES OF INFLUENCE IN THE PAN-EUROPEAN SPACE | 19 
 
Eastern Partnership 
The Commission’s EaP proposals open up some important new 
perspectives, with implications for both Russia and Central Asia.5 These 
proposals are being discussed with member states at the time of writing. 
Preliminary orientations were set at the European Council meeting of 19-20 
March 2009, and more precise decisions will have to be adopted in time for 
the EaP’s launch summit event in early May 2009.  
One of the major proposals for the EaP is the idea of regional-
multilateral activity in four domains (democracy, economics, energy and 
people contacts) for six countries (i.e. Ukr, Mol, Geo, Arm, Azer + Belarus 
to a certain degree), without however Russia or Central Asia. On the other 
hand the Commission proposed that 3rd countries “could be involved … on 
a case by case basis, and if there is agreement” that this would be beneficial. 
These 3rd countries could include Russia, Turkey and in some instances 
maybe Kazakhstan. How this 3rd country participation will play out will be 
of considerable importance in relations to the objectives of the present 
study, and different scenarios may be imagined. The European Council for 
its part on 19-20 March 2009 broadly endorsed the Commission’s 
proposals, but with a slightly more open formulation: “Third countries will 
be eligible for participation on a case by case basis in concrete projects, 
activities and meetings of thematic platforms, where it contributes to the 
objectives of particular activities and the general objectives of the Eastern 
Partnership”.6  
The first question is then whether or how far Russia will be invited to 
join in all or any of the four thematic groups for regional-multilateral work 
of the EaP. The invitation process is itself not entirely clear. Differing 
positions may be presumed, with some new member states and Georgia 
and Ukraine likely to be the most reserved over Russian participation. The 
debate will be about the logic of engagement versus the risks that Russia 
would only be a spoiler. One could expect reservations over Russia’s 
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COM(2008) 823, 3 December 2008. 
6 Declaration by the European Council on the Eastern Partnership – Annex to EU 
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participation on matters of democracy, but a more positive view on 
economics, energy and people contacts.  
The second question is then whether Russia would want to cooperate, 
if invited. Russia would surely prefer to participate as an equal party, not 
as an observer with lesser status. Russia could cite the example of the 
Northern Dimension initiative, and in particular its ‘New Northern 
Dimension’ format since 2007, when it was reshaped into a partnership 
between the EU, Russia, Norway and Iceland, with operating principles 
and procedures that stress the equal partnership between all the parties.7 
These questions of how Russia can fit in with wider regional initiatives 
were also tested at the first Black Sea Synergy ministerial meeting in Kiev 
early in 2008, with quite instructive results. In the Black Sea context, the 
question became whether the regional-multilateral activity should be 
placed either 1) in the institutional setting of the Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation (BSEC) organisation, or 2) be simply open to BSEC member 
states together with the EU. Russia and Turkey pushed for the first option, 
probably for different reasons: Russia, so that it could control 
developments through the BSEC institutional consensus rule, and Turkey 
out of amour propre for this Istanbul-based organisation. The EU favoured 
the second option, while being ready also for the Commission to become 
observer in BSEC. The outcome was actually a compromise, with the 
ministerial meeting divided into two separate sessions, corresponding to 
each of the two options. The risk of Russia acting as spoiler is far from 
being an academic hypothesis, since it has been clearly in evidence in 
recent times in its policy towards both the OSCE and Council of Europe. 
Moreover the comparative failure of BSEC to become an effective regional 
organisation has been ascribed in part to Russia’s blocking position on 
many proposals for action.  
The issue posed by these Black Sea affairs is one of technical 
complexity and political sensitivity for all parties, to the point that the 
Commission felt it necessary in January 2009 to distribute to member states 
a ‘non-paper’ on how to define the respective roles of the Black Sea Synergy 
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and the regional-multilateral part of the EaP.8 This latter would be the first 
instance in which the EU has taken the leadership in an initiative to bring 
together all the European former Soviet states without Russia – either at all, 
or only on an ad hoc and discretionary invitation basis. Critics of this 
initiative could say that it is going in the wrong direction, compared to 
endeavours in which the EU would try to bring the European CIS states 
together in a new spirit of cooperation. But to this criticism there is a more 
subtle counter-argument, which might foresee a sequential game process 
with Russia. According to this argument Russia is a realistic and pragmatic 
foreign policy actor, and its behaviour will depend on the context. If Russia 
sees the opportunity to re-establish a hegemonic or dominant leadership 
role among the former Soviet states, it will readily exploit this. If on the 
other hand Russia observes that this is no longer possible, in part because 
its recent policies have antagonised most of the European former Soviet 
states, and that the EU is making headway in developing its own political 
and economic relationship with these states, then it may judge it better to 
join the process rather than exclude itself. The new EaP initiative, especially 
in its regional-multilateral aspect, may be seen in this light as a message to 
Russia that its recent policies has resulted in increasing unity among EU 
and EaP partner states, and one that creates a new framework that can 
function without Russia. If this initiative becomes sufficiently substantial 
and credible then it might be instrumental in changing Russian views of 
how to pursue its own interests.  
As regards links between Eastern Europe and Central Asia there is a 
special point to be made concerning Kazakhstan, which is the most 
important state of the region to Europe on several grounds: size, energy 
resources, proximity and regional leadership potential (as illustrated by its 
forthcoming OSCE chairmanship). In addition Kazakhstan has made 
overtures towards the Council of Europe for some kind of a more active 
relationship. Most notably in 2008, Kazakhstan published a strategy 
document entitled “The Path to Europe”, which quite carefully and 
pragmatically selected themes for cooperation with the EU. The EU has 
every interest to support this development. One way to do this would be to 
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encourage Kazakhstan to join the EaP regional-multilateral groups 
discussed above. More ambitiously Kazakhstan might be invited as an 
associate of the ENP/EaP process, which could be justified by the 
argument that Kazakhstan is geographically partly in Europe (like Russia 
and Turkey). Another way would be to make Kazakhstan the front-runner 
among Central Asia states for the negotiation of a new agreement to 
replace the obsolete Partnership and Association Agreement. 
While the EU’s Central Asia Strategy has got off to a cautious start 
there are interesting new horizons in prospect with the keen interest of 
China and the Asian Development Bank in this region, as manifest in the 
Bank’s Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) programme, 
which inter alia supports major transport corridors that would go West 
from East and South Asia towards Europe via Central Asia. There should 
be a mutual interest on the part of the EU, which sponsors the pan-
European corridors that go from the EU to its Eastern periphery, to join up 
these corridors. More strategically this could see the EU come to view 
Central Asia not so much as its outer periphery, but more as its bridge into 
Asia proper.  
‘Stability Pact’ or ‘Platform’ for the Caucasus 
For the South Caucasus there is a return to the question of whether the war 
in Georgia could have a positive sequel in the shape of a comprehensive 
initiative for future regional cooperation, perhaps a Stability Pact for the 
Caucasus. This idea surfaced first as a Turkish initiative in 2000, in the wake 
of the Stability Pact for South East Europe. That initiative was never really 
worked out at the official level, although this was done unofficially by 
CEPS.9  
Turkey returns now with the idea of a Caucasus Stability and 
Cooperation Platform, and hosted a first meeting in Istanbul in January 2009 
with five parties present at deputy minister level: Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Russia and Turkey, but without Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
(presumably because Georgia would not have accepted to participate 
otherwise). This restricted participation reflects the growing substance of 
the Russian-Turkish bilateral relationship, which in the South Caucasus has 
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been competitive or conflictual for centuries, but now becomes more 
collaborative. In particular Russia and Turkey share to a degree the same 
urge to look after this region themselves as principal actors, while Iran is 
not invited, and the EU and US are viewed as secondary parties external to 
the region.  
There is little heard so far regarding the substantive activity of the 
Platform.  One could imagine that both Russia and Turkey would be 
interested in investing in good road and rail connections along the Black 
Sea coast, which would require the cooperation of both Abkhazia 
(presumably in favour) and Georgia (presumably against). Similarly there 
are important transport routes through Armenia to Azerbaijan, which are 
currently blocked by the unresolved Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Both 
Russia and Turkey have been volunteering their services as mediators over 
the Nagorno Karabakh question in recent months. Given that Russia has 
been perceived as Armenia’s protector, and Turkey Azerbaijan’s, the 
Russo-Turkish combination could have a serious logic.  
If the EU were to sponsor a Stability Pact (or Platform) for the 
Caucasus it might draw on the experience of the Stability Pact for South 
East Europe, with three working tables for economics, security and politics, 
with more specialised sub-groups having proved necessary for practical 
purposes. A version of this for the Caucasus might be as illustrated in the 
box below.  
Workings of a South Caucasus Stability Pact 
Political and institutional 
•  Establishment of a South Caucasus Community, with a governing 
Council of the 3 South Caucasus states 
     + Associate status for Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno Karabakh (?) 
     + External sponsors, Russia & Turkey; +EU & US (?), Iran (?), OSCE (?)  
•  A Parliamentary Assembly 
Economic policy 
•  External and intra-regional trade and market integration policies 
•  Transport infrastructures and coordination 
•  Energy infrastructure and market coordination 
Security 
•  Security arrangements in and around the former conflict zones 24 | EU POLICIES TOWARDS RUSSIA, EASTERN EUROPE, CENTRAL ASIA & REGIONAL DIMENSIONS 
•  Security sector reform 
•  Cooperation over combating organised crime and drug trafficking 
People 
•  Refugee and IDP return and assistance 
•  Education and youth initiatives 
•  Inter-ethnic truth and reconciliation initiatives 
The Balkan Stability Pact was for almost a decade driven by the EU 
and the West, but in 2008 was transformed into a regionally-owned 
organisation, the Regional Cooperation Council. A South Caucasus 
initiative might follow a similar trajectory, initially relying heavily on 
external sponsors, later becoming a more autonomous community. On 
matters of structure, one may suppose that there would be a core Council 
of the three fully recognised states of the region. The difficulties already 
encountered in the Geneva talks over how to include Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia would have to be resolved. There would be also the question of 
Nagorno Karabakh’s possible representation, which would be most easily 
resolved if it became an autonomous region with a special international 
status. The Northern Cyprus model may be borne in mind in two respects, 
benefiting from a degree of functional cooperation (from the EU) without 
formal recognition, and as a case where the prospect of re-unification may 
improve after decades of conflictual separation.10  
While this idea of a Stability Pact or Platform for the Caucasus is of 
interest, there would have to be choices made in relation to overlapping 
initiatives, which include the EaP and Black Sea Synergy, and the BSEC 
organisation. The three states of the region do not seem keen to focus on 
their ‘Caucasus identity’, and Georgia and Armenia prefer to build on a 
wider Black Sea and European identity. This might leave a Caucasus 
initiative to deal with a modest agenda of technical issues of local 
cooperation.  
Conclusion: The latest development of the European Neighbourhood Policy, 
with its Eastern Partnership dimension, and its proposed regional-multilateral 
activity could actually harden the compartmentalisation between the EU’s policies 
towards the Eastern region and Russia. The institutional arrangements now being 
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proposed for the EaP’s regional-multilateral activity have provisions for its possible 
extension to third countries such as Russia and Turkey, but so far the terms for 
this extension proposed are for an uncertain and ad hoc association. For their part 
Russia and Turkey are initiating a South Caucasus Platform that would exclude 
the EU (and US). These developments are contrary to the hypothesis underlying 
the present report. 
On the other hand there is a still the option for the EU to choose a more 
inclusive formula for the Eastern Partnership, leaving its bilateral activity confined 
to ENP states, but opening the regional multilateral activity to both Russia and 
Turkey more clearly. This could allow also rationalisation of the Black Sea Synergy 
initiative with the regional-multilateral dimension of the Eastern Partnership, 
which might be reciprocated by an opening of the South Caucasus Platform to the 
EU.   
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4.  TRADE POLICY 
rade policy is an inevitable test case for the proposition that there 
might be a better overarching system of cooperation between the EU, 
Eastern Europe and Russia, with conceivable extension to Central 
Asia as well. This follows from several positive pre-conditions: trade is 
invariably at the heart of any regional integrative initiative, the EU’s own 
position in trade policy is one of leadership, Russia has been trying itself to 
create a Eurasian economic space but without much success, and finally 
regional free trade agreements on integration seems to be advancing 
worldwide alongside the failure of the WTO to reach agreement over the 
Doha round at the global level.  
The EU is currently developing its trade policies towards EaP states 
in important ways, starting with the current negotiations with Ukraine for 
a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA). Beyond a 
conventional free trade agreement (FTA), which would just scrap tariffs, 
the DCFTA will liberalise also service sectors and extend to neighbouring 
countries a considerable degree of regulatory harmonisation based on that 
of the EU’s internal market. The Commission proposes to follow on from 
the Ukraine case and use it as a template for further DCFTAs with other 
EaP states. When there is a sufficient number of DCFTAs, the next move 
will be to adopt harmonised rules of origin permitting cumulation of value 
added in supply chains that involve more than two free trade partner 
states. The idea is to develop a regional Neighbourhood Economic 
Community that takes inspiration from the European Economic Area 
(EEA); thus a regime that facilitates increasingly deep integration of trade 
and investment on a regional-multilateral basis. 
However this DCFTA approach, as currently proposed by the 
Commission, has to be taken in two stages: 
o  First, the ‘hub-and-spoke network’ of bilateral FTAs, with variable 
possible degrees of depth and comprehensiveness, would be 
extended into DCFTAs, and 
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o  Second, taking account of the regional-multilateral dimension, steps 
would be taken to harmonise the content of the FTAs.  
The DCFTA proposition raises the question what is the optimal 
feasible content of the package of market integration measures. In the 
extreme case, such as in the EEA with Norway, the partner states accept to 
legislate and implement the entire EU single market acquis. The 
commitment moreover is not only for the stock of EU acquis at the moment 
of signing the treaty, but also has a continuing dynamic aspect: i.e. the 
partner accepts the commitment to automatically follow all subsequent 
single market measures taken by the EU. As Norway has seen with over a 
decade of experience in the EEA, this dynamic aspect has been very 
important, with large blocks of EU service sector regulatory policies 
emerging as a second generation or wave of single market reforms since the 
original 1992 programme for ‘completing’ the single market.  
The EEA package is clearly understood to be an extreme case, which 
should not be attempted by states that are still in the relatively early stages 
of post-communist transition, with weak administrative and technical 
capabilities to adopt such extensive commitments in the foreseeable future. 
But at least this supplies a template, or reference case, by comparison with 
which another template may be constructed to suit the cases of the former 
Soviet states. In this respect the EU’s Action Plans with each partner state 
under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) have been an 
informative preparatory phase of work over the last three years. The 
Commission’s message has been that each partner state is free to choose 
how far to go. However the Action Plans still follow a common and 
comprehensive structure of topics. The variable then becomes how far 
cooperation goes, for example in the fields of banking regulation or agri-
food standards, beyond vague declarations in favour of convergence of 
standards towards legally specified and binding commitments. The ENP 
Action Plans in fact largely remained at the level of vague declarations, and 
it now becomes the task of the FTA (or DCFTA) negotiations to work out 
what can become the subject of legally binding and operational 
commitments.  
Two cases, those of Ukraine and Georgia, allow us to see more clearly 
where the FTA (or DCFTA) process may lead. Both countries have 
comparable levels of both (positive) political commitment towards 
integration with the EU, and (very limited) administrative-technical 
capabilities to implement complex market regulatory policies. The striking 
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combat corruption: Ukraine seems to be chronically incapable of forming a 
coherent government and does nothing to combat endemic corruption; 
Georgia (leaving aside here the catastrophic war with Russia in August 
2008) has shown impressive coherence and determination at the economic 
policy level and done much to reduce corruption. These qualities (and 
weaknesses) link now to the FTA (and DCFTA) issues. 
Ukraine advances in negotiations with the EU to agree a DCFTA as 
part of a new Association Agreement. The Commission has tabled a 
considerable list of single market acquis items for inclusion in the DCFTA, 
including industrial product standards, phyto-sanitary regulations for 
agricultural and agri-food products, customs code regulations, competition 
policy rules, government procurement, intellectual property rights and 
service sector liberalisation. In addition, outside there are sector-specific 
negotiations underway or envisaged for Ukraine to accede to the Common 
European Sky (civil aviation agreement) and the Energy Community 
Treaty (which brings the Western Balkans into the EU regulatory sphere for 
energy policy along with the new member states of South East Europe). 
Both these two last elements, for civil aviation and energy, entail 
commitments at the level taken on by Norway as part of the European 
Economic Area (EEA) in these particular sectors, i.e. taking on board whole 
blocks of EU single market acquis. It may be doubted whether Ukraine is 
actually capable of effectively implementing all these commitments for 
many years, but its overarching political priority to integrate with the EU 
lead it to sign up to such commitments.  
Georgia by comparison has taken a different approach. Its economic 
strategy, which was extremely successful in overcoming the (intentionally 
devastating) Russian trade and economic sanctions from 2006, has been to 
liberalise internally and externally, de-regulate and de-corrupt the 
economy all in radical degrees. However Georgia was surprised to find its 
strategy encountering obstacles when it wanted to negotiate a fast and 
simple FTA with the EU. The Commission adopted the view that the 
DCFTA package is the only template for a useful FTA with the Eastern 
neighbours, and that therefore it was crucial to see whether Georgia was 
sufficiently committed to a substantial degree of single market acquis 
compliance. Commission officials were then somewhat shocked to hear 
Georgian officials (at all levels, officials, ministers, president) say that many 
EU regulations were not suitable for Georgia and would if seriously 
attempted run counter to their de-regulation and de-corruption strategy. 
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negotiations with Georgia, which was not overcome until after the August 
war when these technical objections were overruled at a higher political 
level. 
The moral of this story of the EU’s dealings with these two 
neighbours is that the Commission still has some institutional bias of acting 
as if under the paradigm of accession negotiations, even while underlining 
in official documents that that the ENP states have no membership 
perspective; i.e. using its considerable negotiating capabilities to push the 
neighbours far down the EU acquis convergence road, even when the 
partner state presents reasoned arguments to do less than the Commission 
officials recommends. This point is relevant to the purpose of the present 
paper, which is looking at possible means to establish overarching 
cooperative processes across the Eastern regions; to push for an excessive 
common dosage of EU acquis compliance can become an obstacle.  
The idea of multlilateralising FTAs in the EaP region, with possible 
extension to Russia raises several further issues, both technical and 
political. 
The first, following from the discussion above about Ukraine and 
Georgia, is how deep or simple the common FTA component should be. 
The answer should surely be to identify some core FTA features, especially 
for goods, that would maximise regional economic integration while 
minimising the burden of regulatory harmonisation. The minimal FTA 
content would consist of scrapping tariffs for goods, harmonised customs 
procedures and related matters (such as the TIR regime for goods in 
transit), and acceptance of EU-branded product standards (e.g. those 
carrying the CE mark). This would still leave open the possibility for the 
bilateral FTAs between the EU and individual partner states to take on 
deeper content. Therefore there could be a hybrid regime of a common FTA 
area combined with DCFTAs selectively according to partner state. 
A key additional feature of multilaterising the FTAs would be to 
adopt common rules of origin to permit what is called ‘diagonal 
cumulation’. This means a regime under which the minimum value-added 
required to benefit from the tariff-free advantage could be cumulated 
between two or more partner countries. For example a multi-stage 
production process might see several stages in processing from raw 
materials, to semi-manufactured products, and on to complex component 
parts and then finally finished goods. Each production stage might on its 
own be insufficient to meet the minimum value-added content for the free 
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FTA area it could be sufficient. The EU has seen a massive development of 
this kind of multinational ‘supply chain’ economics. The EU has also 
worked out with its Mediterranean free trade associated states a formal 
harmonised regime called the harmonised Euro-Med rules of origin. This 
system could be extended to an East European FTA area.  
An alternative technique for achieving the same objective is to extend 
the EU’s customs union, which already includes the non-member state 
Turkey. This is technically a superior and bureaucratically simpler system, 
since the EU’s common external tariff (CET) is adopted by customs union 
partners. Since all imports into the customs union will have borne the CET 
there is no need for complicated rules of origin. However a disadvantage is 
that the partner states are unable to have their own preferential trade 
regimes with third countries. This would be an important issue as regards 
Russia, both if it were in or outside the FTA area. If Russia were inside the 
FTA area it would mean a heavy imposition of EU policies of the type that 
Russia objects to as a matter of political principle. If Russia were outside 
there would be the problem for the EaP state that had a major trading 
relationship and a bilateral FTA with Russia (which would have to be 
scrapped). 
This leads finally to the major question whether Russia might be 
interested to join an EU-led FTA area including the EaP states, so to give 
real content to the idea of a Common European Economic Space. Russia has 
been willing to use this language in declaratory documents adopted with 
the EU, and the Commission speaks of the perspective of an FTA with 
Russia as a next step beyond Russia’s WTO accession. As of today Russia is 
not ready politically for this. Even its WTO accession prospects are 
constantly being pushed back by Russian measures that would be difficult 
or incompatible with WTO membership – for example the sanctions against 
Moldova and Georgia adopted in 2006, the export duties on timber decided 
in principle in 2007 but currently deferred for 6 months, and most recently 
the substantial increase in automobile tariffs decided in November 2008 in 
response to the drop in oil and gas revenues.  
The deeper question is whether an FTA with the EU would be in 
Russia’s strategic economic policy interests or not, and if a positive case can 
be justified, how or whether the Russian policy-shaping elite might come 
round to this view. Russia does have the ambition to be a diversified 
industrial economy, rather than one massively dependent on its natural 
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goal are remote, as the economy has been suffering from a pronounced 
‘Dutch disease’ effect, with the high exchange rate undermining the 
chances of building up a new industrial economy with international 
competitiveness. The policy response so far has been to intensify the state’s 
role in the economy in order to rebuild the strength of a very widely 
defined set of ‘strategic’ enterprises and sectors. Foreign investment in 
Russia has been substantial, but in industrial sectors essentially devoted to 
import substitution, a tendency that is reinforced now by the increased 
import duties on automobiles.  
However these tendencies should not be regarded as necessarily 
permanent. The present huge instability of oil prices is showing to Russia 
its vulnerability. It was the earlier reversal of the first 1973 oil shock that is 
seen as having played a significant role in the economic and political 
collapse of the Soviet Union. The now-weakening rouble exchange rate 
may alleviate the concern for cost competitiveness. More fundamentally the 
Russian leadership may come to appreciate the need for deeper integration 
with the European economy as a necessary part of its industrial strategy. 
Russia looks today at both China and the EU as its major economic 
partners. Russian political leaders may stress the Eurasian dimension in 
speeches to counter European pressures on political topics such as 
democracy; but as economic partner Russia is literally terrified at the 
prospect of being overwhelmed by China in any economic sector, and 
geographically in the Far East region in particular. On this comparison one 
can sense that while an FTA between Russia and China is virtually 
inconceivable, an FTA with the EU is a relatively attractive proposition. 
Russia has already experience of very extensive business relationships with 
Europe, first of all with Germany but also with virtually every EU member 
state. The idea of balanced partnerships is more plausible. On top of this 
there may in due course be a swing in the centre of gravity in the thinking 
and analysis of Russian policy-making circles and business interests in 
favour of internationally competitive ‘supply chain’ economics, rather than 
more isolationist-nationalist policies. There is a debate in Russia on the 
choice between these two tendencies – the internationalist modernisers 
versus the nationalist isolationists. For the time being the latter have the 
edge, but circumstances and learning experiences may change this in due 
course. A contributing factor from the EU side could be success in 
developing its FTA area with the EaP states; if this becomes a tangible 
prospect or reality Russia may become extremely concerned about its 
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If the idea of the EaP regional FTA begins to take shape, a natural 
question will be a possible link to the existing Euro-Med free trade area. 
The same logic as that discussed above, that of bilateral FTAs being 
combined with a regional multilateral element with common rules of 
origin, already exists in the Mediterranean region. The EU has bilateral 
FTAs with virtually all Med states, and moves ahead with a regional-
multilateral regime with the most advanced ‘Agadir group’ (Morocco, 
Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan) which have agreed to the ‘Pan-Euro-Med’ rules of 
origin. The scenario could therefore be to create a mega pan-Euro-Med FTA 
with all the neighbourhood countries of East and South that had bilateral 
FTAs with the EU and had agreed the common rules of origin regime.  
Finally, the last conceivable extension of this scenario would be to 
include Central Asia in a grand pan-Eurasian-Med FTA area. There is 
already the CIS-sponsored matrix of bilateral FTAs, including almost all 
Central Asian countries. If Russia were to join the EaP FTA area, there 
could be a movement of interest among the Central Asian states to join in 
a s  w e l l .  T h i s  i s  o f  c o u r s e  t h e  m o s t  r e m o t e  p r o s p e c t  a s  o f  n o w .  K e y  t o  
whether this would remain just a theoretical possibility is Kazakhstan, 
which wishes to give substance to its new ‘Path to Europe’ and already 
shares with Russia membership of their Eurasian Economic Area. The idea 
might be discussed in speeches and seminars, to at least open up mental 
horizons and test reactions.  
Conclusion: The idea of a Pan-European Economic Space is a first candidate 
for consideration, because it could be based on existing EU competences and the 
current momentum in extension of the EU’s network of regional free trade 
agreements. Negotiations for Deep Free Trade Agreements (DFTAs) are underway 
or envisaged for the Eastern partners, and the mechanism of harmonised pan-Euro-
Mediterranean rules of origin exists and can be extended in application with a view 
to a wider pan-European (or Euro-Med) regional-multilateral free trade area. In 
addition the Commission expresses its interest in an FTA with Russia. But here 
there is still a blockage, first with Russia’s failure yet to join the WTO, but also 
with more fundamental opposition within Russia to an FTA with the EU, which 
some consider to be advantageous mainly for the EU. The current global recession 
intensifies Russian protectionism (e.g. already for cars). The counterargument is 
that Russia’s economic policy is failing to develop a diversified and competitive 
industrial economy, and that at some point trade liberalisation with the EU will 
have to be part of the remedial therapy.  34 | 
 
5.  TRANSPORT NETWORKS 
he planning and implementation of pan-European transport networks 
fits naturally into the logic of the present study.  
Early work on pan-European transport issues in the 1980s was led by 
the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). However in the 1990s, 
with the introduction of the Trans-European Network (TEN) concept in the 
Maastricht Treaty, the European Community became the leading actor. The 
EU adopted 30 priority projects for road and rail corridors, which will take 
until 2020 to be completed and are receiving massive financing from 
national and EU (Commission, European Investment Bank) sources, with 
€126 billion of investments up to 2007, another €150 billion until 2013, and a 
further €120 billion by 2020.11 These investments mainly concern the 
enlarged EU of 27 member states.  
However at the same time there has been ambitious planning work 
done at the pan-European level, extending these networks into the former 
Soviet Union. An overall concept was established at a first conference of 
transport ministers in Prague in 1991. At their second conference in Crete in 
1994 ministers defined ten priority pan-European transport corridors as 
routes in Central and Eastern Europe that required major investment over 
the following ten to fifteen years. Additions were made at the third 
conference in Helsinki in 1997. These corridors are distinct from the Trans-
European transport networks within the European Union, although there 
are proposals to combine the two systems.  
The pan-European corridors that link the EU to Russia, Belarus and 
Ukraine are the following: 
o  Corridor II:  Road and rail link connecting Berlin–Warsaw–Minsk-
Moscow-Nizhny Novgorod. Major investments have been made in 
the Polish segment. Rehabilitation and upgrading of motorway in the 
                                                      
11 European Commission, “TEN-T – Trans-European Transport Projects – 
Implementation of the Priority Projects Progress Report”, May 2008. 
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Belarus and Russian segments are needed, together with technical 
modernisation and administrative improvements of border crossings, 
which still suffer long delays.  
o  Corridor III:  Road and rail connection between Dresden–Wroclaw–
L’viv–Kiev. The Ukrainian road segments (2 lane highways) do not 
yet meet European standards, and the delays at border crossings into 
Ukraine are substantial (4-5 hours). Some European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) funding is being made 
available.  
o  Corridor V:  Road and rail connections between Venice–Trieste–
Koper–Ljubljana–Budapest–Uzgorod–L’viv. The Ukrainian segment 
achieves limited success so far, helped however by some EBRD 
investments.  
o  Corridor IX:  Road and rail connection between Helsinki–St. 
Petersburg–Pskov/Moscow–Kiev–Ljubasevka–Chisinau–Bucharest–
Dimitrovgrad–Alexandroupolis. Improvements have been made in 
infrastructure, but administrative problems at border crossings 
remain the major hindrances to road and rail traffic along this 
corridor.12 
Following the strong development of the TEN networks in the 
enlarged EU it was decided in 2004 to create a high-level group to prepare 
plans to extend these to neighbouring countries and regions. This High 
Level (Palacio) Group, brought together the EU member states, 26 
neighbouring countries through to Central Asia and the international 
financial institutions (IFIs) to plan a set of trans-European transport axes. 
Its report of November 200513 identified five such axes, four of which are 
relevant to the present study: 
o  Motorways of the seas, including the Black Sea and Caspian Sea. This 
would consist of 14 priority projects, including investments at the 
                                                      
12 For a comprehensive report on the ten Pan-European corridors, see “PAN-
EUROSTAR - Pan-European Transport Corridors and Areas Status Report”, Final 
Report, November 2005.  
13 European Commission, “Networks for Peace and Development – Extension of 
the major trans-European transport axes to the neighbouring countries and 
regions”, Report of the High Level Group chaired by Loyala de Palacio, November 
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Russian ports of St. Petersberg, Ust-Luga and Novorossisk, and 
Illyiehevsk (Ukraine), Poti (Georgia) and Baku (Azerbaijan).  
o  Northern axis, joining the EU with the Norwegian/Russian Barents 
region. 
o  Central axis, from the EU through Ukraine to the Caucasus and 
Central Asia, with connections also to the Volga River basin and the 
Trans-Siberian railway. Overall 19 road, rail and multi-modal projects 
were identified, mostly falling in Russia and Ukraine, and including a 
high-speed railway connection between St. Petersberg and Moscow, 
improved connections with the trans-Siberian railway, upgrading of 
main highways in Ukraine, and other fundamental infrastructures. 
o  South-eastern axis, from the EU through the Balkans and Turkey 
through to the Caucasus and Caspian regions and connections with 
Russia. This would consist of 46 priority projects, mostly located in 
South-East Europe, with extensions through Turkey into the South 
Caucasus and Middle East.  
The total cost of the projects identified to support the fives axes of the 
Palacio report was estimated at €45 billion, of which €35 billion would be 
invested until 2020.  
The EU has in addition developed an ambitious programme for 
southern transport routes from the EU through the Black Sea and Caspian 
Sea region into Central Asia. This TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe-
Caucasus-Asia) initiative was established in a multilateral agreement 
signed in 1998, and aimed at improving road, rail and maritime transport 
networks linking 14 states of the East European, Caucasian and Central 
Asian region (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Romania, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine 
and Uzbekistan). TRACECA’s initiating conference was subtitled 
Restoration of the Historic Silk Route, thus suggesting a high level of 
ambition. Since 2001 it has a permanent secretariat based in Baku. It thus 
works on southern routes without Russia. TRACECA has developed a 
large agenda of projects to support identified transport routes, as well as 
efforts at reform and convergence of legal and regulatory regimes.  
Notwithstanding its ambitious objectives the TRACECA initiative is 
generally considered to be rather unsuccessful. The reasons for this seem to 
be the weak inclination of the Central Asian governments to enter into 
cooperative relations with their neighbours, the limitation of the EU’s 
contribution to mainly technical assistance, without strong investment 
financing, and the weakness of the permanent secretariat in Baku.  SYNERGIES VS. SPHERES OF INFLUENCE IN THE PAN-EUROPEAN SPACE | 37 
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The Northern Dimension programme, initiated in 1998 under Finnish 
leadership, and renewed in 2007 in a new format bringing together the EU, 
Iceland, Norway and Russia, has seen perhaps the most advanced efforts to 
extend the transnational corridors and axes beyond the EU’s territory.14 
This reflects the relatively compact geographic area under consideration, 
the technical-diplomatic competence and focus of the Finnish and 
Norwegian diplomats and experts driving the programme, coupled with 
the resources of the European Union. Since a large part of EU-Russian trade 
passes through Baltic sea ports and road and rail links to Finland and the 
Baltic states, in principle the EU and Russia share the same objective of 
providing an efficient transport infrastructure to service this trade. 
However Russia has moved away from the idea of ‘Pan-European’ 
networks, in favour of ‘Russia’s international transport connections’. This 
difference of language is reflected concretely in Russia’s drive to develop 
its own port facilities in North-West Europe, for example with new ports 
such as Ust-Luga and Primorsk intended to displace the existing ports of 
Baltic Sea states and Finland, as well as Gazprom’s drive together with 
German business interests to build the Nord Stream pipeline direct to 
Germany, by-passing the transit countries of land routes. The development 
plan of Russian railways is coordinated with these port developments. 
Russia also seeks to develop its own transit role to the East, seeking to be 
the transport bridge for Chinese and other Far East trade with Europe, 
including by air flights overflying Siberia.15 In addition Russia’s domestic 
infrastructures are in bad need of rehabilitation at huge cost: the railway 
development plan calls for €360 billion of investments until 2030, whereas 
the transport system as a whole calls for investments of €583 billion until 
2015.16  
                                                      
14  The New Northern Dimension, op. cit. See in particular the chapter by Katri 
Pynnoniemi, “EU-Russian cooperation on transport: Prospects for the Northern 
Dimension Transport Partnership”. 
15 The Siberian overflying fees, amounting to €330 million in 2005, remains a long-
standing subject of contention between the EU and Russia. The EU regards these 
fees as contravening the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation. 
In 2007 there was a further row over Russian pressure on Lufthansa to move its 
regional cargo hub from Astana in Kazakhstan to Krasnoyarsk in Russia. 
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While Russia has thus been prioritising the development of new 
infrastructures and renewing old ones, the EU has been more concerned 
over the inefficiencies (long delays, obsolete administrative procedures, 
and corruption) at border crossings into Russia from Finland, Belarus and 
Ukraine. These issues are at least being addressed in working group 
meetings between the EU and Russia, both in the regional framework of the 
Northern Dimension and in the wider framework of the EU-Russia 
‘common spaces’. The latter EU-Russia activity consists of a ‘dialogues’ in 
five working groups, for air, maritime, inland waterway, road and rail 
transport.  
In spite of these various difficulties it was agreed in October 2008 by 
the Northern Dimension partners to engage in more strongly structured 
cooperation in the transport domain through setting up a Northern 
Dimension Partnership on Transport and Logistics. This will be established 
during 2009 and become fully operational on 1 January 2010. This will be a 
jointly agreed programme covering all modes of transport, with a focus on 
both infrastructural and non-infrastructural sources of bottlenecks. There 
will be a three-level institutional set-up, with high-level ministerial 
meetings, a steering group of senior officials and a permanent secretariat. 
Several IFIs are invited to collaborate – the Nordic Investment Bank (NIB), 
the EBRD, EIB and World Bank. Notably relevant for the present study, 
Belarus is invited to join the Partnership, given its importance for road, rail 
and energy pipeline transit.  
It is a matter for consideration whether this Partnership model might 
be extended to other regions of the wider European neighbourhood. There 
would be two main candidates for such an approach: the central axis with 
the transit role of Ukraine, and the south-eastern axis going beyond south-
east Europe through to Central Asia and the Far East. For the central axis 
both Ukraine and Moldova are open to adopting elements of the EU’s 
transport  acquis, unlike Russia. This regulatory approximation would 
therefore be organised on a bilateral basis with these countries, leaving the 
possible Partnership to deal with other infrastructure matters. To the East 
the strategic question for the EU is how to develop both of two routes to the 
north and south of the Black Sea. The TRACECA project favours the 
southern route to the exclusion of Russia.  
Extending further east, there are also Joint Ministerial meetings of the 
Euro-Asian Transport Conference, the 4th held in Warsaw in June 2007, 
which aims at promoting road transport connections between South-East 40 | TRANSPORT NETWORKS 
Asia, China and Europe. The World Congress of the International Road 
Transport Union in Istanbul in May 2008, held under the title The Revival 
of the Silk Road, launched the New Eurasian Land Transport Initiative 
(NELTI), identifying three routes: 
o  Northern, from Moscow through Kazakhstan into China; 
o  Central, from South East Europe across the Black Sea-Caucasus-
Caspian Sea through Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan into 
China, and 
o  Southern, from Turkey through Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan into China. 
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) and China are keen to develop 
the land routes between the EU and China transiting Central Asia. Since 
1997 the ADB has been promoting the Central Asia Regional Economic 
Cooperation (CAREC) programme, which brings together all Central Asian 
states (except Turkmenistan), Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China and 
Mongolia. In November 2008 the ADB announced a $700 million loan to 
improve a segment of the central route through Kazakhstan, as part of an 
ambitious $6.7 billion programme to be completed by 2015. Especially 
interesting from a European standpoint is the CAREC programme for 
regulatory harmonisation and simplification, which seeks to find a rational 
way ahead amidst the conflicting standards of the former Soviet Union, 
China and the EU.17 The CAREC policy roadmap in fact recommends a 
significant convergence on EU standards for road vehicles and emissions, 
and for cross-border transport user charges. There is therefore a natural 
partnership to be developed between the EU and its TRACECA 
programme and CAREC. On funding on the European side the EBRD is 
already fully mandated to work on transport infrastructures, and the 
European Investment Bank received at the end of 2008 a mandate to extend 
its operations beyond East Europe and Russia into central Asia. The ENPI 
now has a grant investment facility which can be usefully combined with 
equity and loan investment funds from the EBRD and EIB, but again there 
is at present a limitation of these ENPI funds to the Eastern Partnership 
states.  
                                                      
17 Asian Development Bank, “Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation: 
Harmonisation and Simplification of Transport Agreements, Cross-Border 
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Conclusion: The pan-European transport infrastructures and networks has 
been the subject of intensive planning work for almost two decades, with the 
successful (consensual) identification of priority axes or corridors. At the level of 
implementation relatively large sums are being invested by the EU institutions 
and national governments in the intra-EU networks. Their extension beyond the 
EU into Eastern Europe and Central Asia progresses much less fast, due not only 
to lesser access to funding, but also to bureaucratic and political obstacles. A new 
development is the interest coming from East Asia in developing the major 
Eurasian land connections, with projects leading into Central Asia supported by 
the Asian Development Bank: these could be linked up with EU-supported projects. 
The opening of a mandate for the EIB to operate in Central Asia in co-financing 
operations with the EBRD could link up with ADB-funded Eurasian transport 
corridors.  43 | 
 
6.  ENERGY 
he main gas pipelines, actual and projected, connecting the EU with 
Russia and Central Asia with various possible transit routes through 
Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, highlight different paradigms: of 
strategic cooperation and solidarity versus competition and differentiated 
risk exposure. These issues were dramatically amplified by the January 
2009 crisis with the cutting of supplies through Ukraine to Europe for two 
weeks, with serious damage suffered immediately by Slovakia and 
Bulgaria. The responsibility for the stoppage is contested between Russia 
and Ukraine, while the President of the Commission blamed both parties. 
The strategic pipeline options are well identified: the actual Ukraine 
and Belarus transit routes, and the planned Nord Stream, South Stream, 
Nabucco and Southern Corridor projects.  
Ukraine’s gas transportation system (GTS)  
Ukraine’s GTS currently transports 80% of Russian gas supplies to Europe. 
The capacity of the trunk gas transit pipeline is currently around 120 billion 
cubic meters, exceeding the capacity of all bypassing projects taken 
together. Since the early 1990s, Ukrainian-Russian relations in the energy 
sphere have been volatile and disruptive. On 1 January 2006 Gazprom 
interrupted the gas supply to Ukraine following their disagreement over a 
gas price. In response, Ukraine started to withdraw gas from the transit 
pipeline. The crisis acquired a European dimension, after several European 
states did not receive their gas in full. The new crisis three years later, in 
January 2009, followed the same sequence: deadlocked negotiations over 
price, then supply interruption, then a compromise agreement on price and 
supply resumption.  
Moreover, the technical state of Ukraine’s GTS is of great concern. 
Most of the pipelines were built in the period from 1960 to 1980 and since 
the collapse of the USSR have not undergone comprehensive checks and 
repairs. Already in 2004 an expert study indicated that 20% of the pipelines 
exceeded their life span. This increases the risk of a technical breakdown 
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causing a disruption of supplies to the EU. In 2007 an EU-commissioned 
study determined that €2.5 billion would be needed to rehabilitate the GTS. 
Due to defective economic governance, Naftogaz – a state energy company, 
which operates the pipeline – has often been in debt-default and is unable 
to ensure such investments. The European Commission and Ukraine co-
organised a conference in March 2009 to address the financing of repair 
work. 
 
Countries affected by the January 2009 gas crisis 
 
Source: BBC (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7830517.stm). 
Yamal-Europe pipeline 
The Yamal-Europe pipeline was built in 1999 with a view of avoiding 
Ukraine and transporting Russian gas through Belarus and Poland to 
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of the pipeline – with a yearly capacity of 65 billion cubic meters (bcm) of 
gas – running along each other. Only the first line – currently transporting 
around 33 bcm – has been built so far. The Polish section is managed by a 
private company, Europol Gaz, 48% of which belongs to Gazprom and 
another 48% to PGNiG, a Polish state energy company. The Belarusian 
section is managed by a state energy company Beltransgaz. In 2007 Belarus 
pledged to sell a 50% stake in Beltransgaz to Gazprom by 2011 in exchange 
for a gradual rising of the gas price to the European level. Already in 2000 
Gazprom renounced its plans to build the second line of the Yamal-Europe 
pipeline, despite its relatively cheap cost, since the first pipeline was laid 
down with a view of fitting the second line. Gazprom’s decision has been 
motivated by the desire to completely avoid the transit states, notably 
through the Nord Stream project economic costs. 
Nord Stream 
The Nord Stream pipeline, planned since 2000, is intended to run offshore 
from Vyborg in Russia to Greisfwald in Germany. The first line – with a 
capacity of 25 bcm of gas per year – is planned to be operating by 2011, but 
this timetable seems likely to slip by a few years. The project is still 
undergoing environmental assessments with Baltic states expressing 
concern. The pipeline would be supplied with gas coming from the 
Shtockman gas field, planned to be put in operation by Gazprom (with 
Total and StatoilHydro as its partners) by the time Nord Stream is ready. 
The estimated costs of the pipeline are around €7.4 billion. It is to be owned 
and built by a consortium, including Gazprom (51%), E.ON Ruhrgas (20%), 
BASF (20%), and Gasunie (9%). No pipes have yet been laid in the Baltic 
Sea, but large quantities of pipes have been contracted for about €500 
million, and are being supplied and stocked near St. Petersberg. 
South Stream 
This proposed gas pipeline was initially planned to transport 30 bcm of 
Russian natural gas across the Black Sea to be landed in Bulgaria, but the 
latest statements from Gazprom cite 47 bcm. The offshore section crosses 
the Black Sea from the Russian coast at Beregovaya (where also the Blue 
Stream pipeline originates) to Varna on the Bulgarian coast for a total of 900 46 | ENERGY 
kilometres through Ukrainian waters at maximum depths of 2,000 meters.18 
The project began to advance in June 2007, with the signing of a 
Memorandum of Understanding by Gazprom and Eni.19 Then, in January 
2008, the two companies created a joint venture, South Stream AG, equally 
owned by the two companies. A feasibility study is expected to be 
completed by Saipem, a subsidiary of Eni, by the end of 2009.20 The latest 
Gazprom statements indicate that a more southerly route through Turkish 
waters is now being considered. At the same time the estimated cost is said 
to have doubled over the latest year, to reach €19-24 billion.21  
South Stream has two possible routes, the first heading south-west 
through Greece and Albania and then crossing the Adriatic Sea to join the 
Italian network, and the second heading north-west crossing Serbia and 
Hungary on into Central Europe, and linking the other gas pipelines from 
Russia. The project is planned to become operational in 2012. The 
consortium needs to make agreements with the transit countries, and 
Russia has been doing this with agreements concluded with Bulgaria, 
Serbia, Hungary and Greece.22 In general, the project has been welcomed 
by transit countries, but is contested by Ukraine, through whose maritime 
shelf it has to pass.23 Although Ukraine’s power to ban the project is in 
doubt, some speculate that Ukraine will permit the construction of South 
Stream in exchange for the Russian permit to build the White Stream 
offshore gas pipeline from Georgia to Ukraine. Also, Gazprom has not been 
able to find an agreement with Austria (which instead supports the rival 
Nabucco project) leading to a re-thinking of the north-bound route which 
may instead pass through Slovenia.  
  
                                                      
18 The South Stream Project, Eni and Gazprom, 23 June 2007, Rome. 
19 Eni, “Gazprom set up company for South Stream gas pipelines”, Forbes.com, 18 
January 2008 (http://www.forbes.com/feeds/afx/2008/01/18/afx4548113.html). 
20  Gazprom’s plans for South Stream gas pipeline become more ambitious, 
Businessnewseurope, 13 February 2009 (http://businessneweurope.eu/story1451/ 
Gazproms_plans_for_South_Stream_gas_pipeline_become_more_ambitious). 
21 South Stream to boost Europe’s energy security, 10 February 2009, RIA NOVOSTI. 
22  South Stream to boost Europe’s energy security, RIA Novosti, 10 February 2009 
(http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20090210/120071766.html). 
23 Stanimir Vaglenov, South Stream Turns into Southern Dream, 9 December 2008, 
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Possible routes of proposed gas pipelines 
 
Source: Eni. 48 | ENERGY 
Nabucco  
The planned Nabucco pipeline would transport natural gas from Turkey to 
Austria, via Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary. It will run from Erzurum in 
Turkey to Baumgarten an der March, a major natural gas hub in Austria. Its 
total length is expected to be 3,300  kilometres and its estimated cost is 
around €7.9 billion. The initial deliveries are expected to be between 4.5 
and 13 billion cubic meters per annum, of which 2 to 8 bcm would go to 
Baumgarten. By 2020, the transmission volume is expected to reach 31 bcm 
per annum, of which up to 16 bcm would go to Baumgarten. The project is 
backed by the European Union and the United States.  
Nabucco pipeline route 
 
 
The adequacy of gas supplies to fill the Nabucco-pipeline is the 
subject of continuing debate. Different supply sources discussed include:  
o  Azerbaijan. The Shah Deniz gas fields should come onstream in 2013 
(8 bcm) 
o  Turkmenistan. It could possibly supply around 10 bcm if the Trans-
Caspian gas pipeline would be built.  
o  Iran. This option is for the time being rejected by the US and the EU. 
o  Kazakhstan. It has huge reserves and could in principle provide gas 
through the planned trans-Caspian gas pipeline if the latter would be 
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o  Egypt. Their new gas discoveries might feed Nabucco through the 
Arab Gas Pipeline but the increase in domestic demand may limit 
Egypt’s’ exports. 
o  Iraq. This option seems not to be considered now. 
o  Russia. Its gas could feed Nabucco through the Blue Stream pipeline.  
Six companies are currently involved in the project: OMV of Austria, 
MOL of Hungary, Bulgargaz of Bulgaria, the German RWE (since February 
2008), Transgaz of Romania and BOTAŞ of Turkey. Each of them owns 
16.67% of the shares. The talks on the project first started in February 2002 
and, in June 2002, five companies signed a protocol of intention to construct 
it, followed by a Cooperation Agreement in October 2002. The project was 
confirmed at the political level at a summit meeting in Budapest on 27 
January 2009 attended by the consortium partners (Austria, Bulgaria, 
Germany, Romania and Turkey), potential suppliers (Azerbaijan, Egypt, 
Iraq and Turkmenistan) and transit country Georgia, the European 
Commission and the current Czech Presidency. 
Southern corridor 
The Nabucco project also leads on to related initiatives to pipe gas across 
the Caspian from Turkmenistan. At the Nabucco summit on 26-27 January 
2009, the communiqué welcomed the Commission’s initiative to establish a 
Caspian Development Corporation (CDC) and a Caspian Energy Company 
(CEC), launched by the Austrian OMV company and the German RWE. 
These initiatives are intended to assure the supply of Turkmen gas into 
Nabucco, the prospects for which have been improving with better 
relations between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, and a recent report (from 
a European consultancy) of greatly increased reserves in Turkmenistan. 
These developments open the prospect of being able to reconcile 
Turkmenistan’s existing commitments to supply large quantities to Russia 
(for onward sale to the EU) with a trans-Caspian pipeline to Baku (securing 
the viability of Nabucco) as well as a pipeline to China.  
Gazprom’s financial constraints 
Gazprom is hard hit by the global economic and financial crisis. The 
demand for Russian gas from Europe in November 2008 fell by 24% in 
comparison to October, and the price for European importers is expected to 
fall, following the oil price, from $400-500 per thousand m3 to $250-280 in 
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fall by 31.7%, or $20 billion, in 2009.24 Gazprom’s plans to compensate for 
its future losses by raising internal gas prices also seem increasingly 
unrealistic, given the tense social situation. As a result Gazprom might 
have limited access to Western credit, which might have an adverse affect 
on the Nord Stream project, as 70% of its costs are planned to be covered 
with borrowings from the international market, and even more so the less 
advanced South Stream project.25 It might make Gazprom and its European 
partners look for more economical solutions.  
A gas transit consortium in Ukraine 
An international gas transit consortium – bringing Ukraine, the EU and 
Russia to jointly manage the Ukrainian trunk gas pipeline – could in this 
situation provide a solution, addressing the energy security challenges of 
Russia as a supplier, Ukraine for its transit role and the EU as consumer. 
An attempt to establish such a consortium was undertaken in 2002, but 
failed to reach agreement.26 In 2004 the parties returned to the status quo, 
which has proved so defective. 
Three types of arrangement for a consortium could be considered: 
privatisation and sale, a concession under a long-term lease or a 
management contract. Currently, the privatisation of the GTS is prohibited 
by a law “On Pipelines” that was almost unanimously voted in by the 
Ukrainian parliament in February 2007. On the other hand, a management 
contract would leave the need to finance major investments in 
rehabilitation of the GTS with the Ukrainian government. As the middle 
way, a concession of the major trunk pipeline trunk for a period of between 
25 to 50 years would seem the best solution for all parties.  
                                                      
24 “Gazprom poteriaet v Evrope $20 milliardov”, Kommersant, 15 December 2008 
(http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1094437). 
25 “Prositsia v trubu”, Vedomosti 23 December 2008 (http://www.vedomosti.ru/ 
newspaper/article.shtml?2008/12/23/174909). 
26 A possibility to establish an international gas transportation consortium has been 
evaluated by Razumkov Centre, Gas Transportation Consortium, National Security 
and Defense Magazine, No. 1, 2004 (http://www.uceps.org/files/ 
category_journal/NSD49_eng.pdf) and World Bank, Ukraine: Challenges facing the 
gas sector, 2003. For a detailed investigation of the consortium negotiations, see 
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Due to the high sensitivity of the subject, consortium negotiations 
would need to be conducted at both corporate and political levels. The 
corporate negotiations should be conducted by Gazprom, Naftohaz, one or 
more European energy companies and the EBRD. The European 
participation might be selected on the basis of an open competition (in the 
past Ruhrgas, Gaz de France, ENI and Shell demonstrated interest in 
participating). The consortium would take the form of a public-private 
partnership, and could also secure substantial funding from the 
participating governments, the European Commission, the EBRD, EIB and 
the World Bank. The EBRD in particular is able to take an equity share 
participation in such projects. The EIB and World Bank could supply 
substantial loan capital. The division of shareholdings between participants 
could take many different formulas in the detail. However from a strategic 
point of view it would seem plausible that neither the EU, Russian nor 
Ukrainian party would have a dominant position, for example 30% each 
with a remaining 10% taken up by the EBRD. The role of the EBRD could 
be particularly valuable, since its professional task would be to assure the 
correct corporate governance of the consortium.  
The EU, Russia and Ukraine would provide the political guarantees. 
In addition to an agreement between consortium participants there should 
be a binding Treaty establishing the ground rules, signed and ratified by 
the EU, and Russian and Ukrainian governments. The treaty would inter 
alia protect the consortium from political instability and establish the 
highest-level legal basis for its operations. In particular it should specify 
how the trunk pipeline of the consortium would be legally and 
managerially separate from the domestic Ukrainian gas distribution 
network. It should further guarantee the ground rules for the setting of 
transit fees, which would be the secure revenue base of the consortium, and 
hence a bankable basis upon which to raise funding for renewal and repair 
of the pipeline.  
There are indications that Moscow remains interested in the 
consortium idea, with recent speeches to this effect by both Medvedev and 
Putin.27  
                                                      
27 See Medvedev’s speech, Germany, 5 June 2008 at http://www.kremlin.ru/ 
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Discussion of alternative scenarios 
The proposed reconfiguration of the Ukrainian trunk pipeline, if it could be 
made to work correctly, would clearly be the most economical option, 
costing only about €2 billion of rehabilitation costs. Its political implications 
for tripartite cooperation on such an important matter would also be 
exactly in line with the strategic idea underlying the present study. The 
South Stream project, especially if added to a rehabilitated Ukrainian 
pipeline and Nord Stream, would be very costly and probably beyond 
Russia’s supply potential. The Nabucco pipeline is desirable as an 
instrument of supply diversification and security, and its supply prospects, 
while still uncertain, seem to be improving especially with the other 
Southern Corridor initiatives. Nabucco could still become a cooperative 
venture with both Russia and Central Asian states as well as South East 
Europe, since Russian gas could enter it via the Blue Stream pipeline across 
the Black Sea into Turkey. One could also envisage a partial merger of the 
Nabucco and South Stream projects on land west of Bulgaria: i.e. if 
Gazprom was able to fund and supply the South Stream across the Black 
Sea it might make a cooperation agreement to share the on-land pipelines 
to be laid across South East Europe. 
The EU’s gas supply security would of course also be greatly 
improved by internal EU measures along the lines already proposed by the 
Commission (internal gas network connections for Baltic and South East 
European countries, internal gas market integration, network connections 
to the growing capacity of LNG import terminals).  
Conclusion: For the purpose of the present study, seeking synergies from 
cooperative projects between the EU, Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, the 
gas pipeline network options are of inescapable importance. There are now five 
major pipelines, actual or planned, that come into play: the two main land routes 
from Russia transiting through Ukraine and Belarus, the Nord and South Stream 
projects that would avoid transit countries before reaching the EU, and the 
Nabucco/Southern Corridor being promoted by the EU. Of these a reconfiguration 
of the Ukrainian trunk pipeline, with a long-term concession leased to a tripartite 
(EU-RUS-UKR) consortium supported by a tri-partite Treaty, could offer 
outstanding economic and political benefits. The Nabucco/Southern Corridor plans 
also open up tripartite (EU, Eastern Europe, Central Asia) cooperative 
possibilities, which could conceivably become quadripartite if Russia accepted the 
offer to join in too.  
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7.  THE WATER-ENERGY-FOOD NEXUS IN 
CENTRAL ASIA 
n Central Asia there is a need to address the major crisis in the regional 
hydroenergy-water–food nexus, with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan unable 
to develop their full hydro-electric potential sufficiently for their own 
energy needs, while their limited release of waters for irrigating agriculture 
in the three downstream countries results in food shortage crises, especially 
in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.28 The result is already seen in 
humanitarian distress through lack of heating and/or food, and threatens 
to provoke inter-state conflicts. The ecological disaster of the Aral Sea is a 
further result of the gross mismanagement of water resources, starting in 
the Soviet period.  
The water resources of Central Asia, and the Aral Sea basin in 
particular, flow from two major river basins, the Syr-Darya and Amu-
Darya, most of whose waters originate in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, 
respectively. Most of these water resources end up being used for irrigating 
the agriculture of downstream Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. 
The demand for water has exceeded supply for many years. However this 
water deficit is certain to worsen with fast-growing populations, industrial 
development and the expansion of irrigated land. Moreover global 
warming is rapidly shrinking the water reserves in the glaciers of the Pamir 
and Alay mountains; these decreased by 25% between 1957 and 2000, and 
are expected to decline a further 25% by 2025. These problems are further 
exacerbated by the seasonal conflicts of interest, between the upstream 
                                                      
28 For detailed accounts see Eurasian Development Bank, “EDB Eurasian 
Integration Yearbook, 2008”, Almaty; and in particular a study of the EBD Strategy 
and Research Department, “Water and Energy Resources in Central Asia: 
Development and Utilisation Issues”; and UNDP, Regional Office for Europe and 
the CIS, “Central Asia Regional Risk Assessment: Responding to Water, Energy, 
and Food Security”, January 2009. 
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states wishing to maximise their winter off-take of water to generate hydro 
electricity, whereas the downstream states need the water in the summer. 
As the competitive struggle for water resources becomes increasingly 
severe, political strains rise, with correspondingly growing chances of open 
conflict. Low-level conflict can easily arise since the downstream countries 
control vital transport routes into the upstream states. The Uzbek-Tajik 
relationship has shown continuous tensions.  
Water management in Central Asia: state and impact 
 
Source: UN Environmental Programme. 
In Soviet times the water discharge was maximised during summer 
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and as a result Kyrgyzstan massively shifted its seasonal pattern of water 
discharge from summer to winter, thus causing catastrophic difficulties 
downstream (in 1995-2007 it discharged 2.5 times as much in winter as in 
1985-1991, whereas in the summer it discharged in 1995-2007 two-thirds of 
the amount during 1985-1991).  
Both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan wish to develop their hydro-electric 
power sectors. UN sources estimate that Tajikistan is only using 5%, and 
Kyrgyzstan 14% of their hydro-electric potential. The biggest hydro power 
plants planned are at Rogun in Tajikistan and Kambarata in Kyrgyzstan, 
both of which would cost around $2-3 billion. An uncoordinated 
exploitation of these expanded hydroelectric facilities would risk further 
aggravating the problems in downstream states of winter flooding and 
summer shortages. The Russian aluminium company RUSAL was planning 
to be the lead investor in the Rogun project but has withdrawn in favour of 
smaller projects. The main Russian electricity enterprise, RAO UES, has 
extensive interests in Kyrgyz and Tajik electricity networks, and will surely 
wish to play a leading role there, but they cannot alone manage the entire 
challenge. However the major IFIs here, the World Bank and Asian 
Development Bank, have a policy not to invest in major hydro power 
plants unless adequate consultative procedures with downstream states 
and ecological impact assessments have been satisfactorily completed. They 
have not participated in new hydro installations in the last 15 years.  
A systematization of international law in this field was assembled 
first in the 1966 Treaty on The Helsinki Rules for the utilization of the 
waters of international rivers, which set out the principle of ‘reasonable and 
f a i r  u s e ’  o f  s u c h  w a t e r s  a n d  r e f u t e d  the idea of unrestricted territorial 
sovereignty over trans-border rivers. These Helsinki Rules however are 
only recommendations, and it took until 1997 for the UN General Assembly 
to approve what could become a legally binding instrument, the 
Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Utilisation of International 
Rivers. But the Convention had been signed by only 16 states and ratified 
by only 9, and is unlikely to come into force in the near future. Other 
elements of international law include the EU’s framework Water Directive, 
which is an example of highly operational legislation, but of course it has 
jurisdiction only within the EU.  
The states of Central Asia have signed many multilateral regional 
agreements on water usage since the beginning of the post-Soviet period, 
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Utilisation and Protection of Water Resources from Inter-State Sources. 
However most of these texts, including various bilateral agreements, have 
not been implemented, although they may have served to prevent the 
outbreak of open conflict and responded to short-term crisis situations. In 
October 2008 there was a short-term agreement made by all five Central 
Asian states under which Kazakhstan would supply electricity and coal to 
Kyrgyzstan (and further agreed to provide financial assistance in 
December), Uzbekistan would supply electricity to both Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan would supply electricity via Uzbekistan. In 
return Kyrgyzstan committed itself to release specified quantities of water 
to Uzbekistan for irrigation early in the vegetative period in 2009. 
Electricity supplies for Turkmenistan increased substantially in the last 
quarter of 2008, but then the curse of non-cooperation struck again. 
Tensions remain between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan over the former’s 
plans to expand the Rogun dam, the agreement over the transiting of 
Turkmen electricity through Uzbekistan to Tajikistan broke down, and 
latest information is that these supplies were stopped in January 2009.29 
The challenge therefore remains of working out a complex 
multinational cooperation agreement and financing major investments. 
There have been several attempts already to design a strategy by the World 
Bank, the US and an EU technical assistance project. Such a strategy would 
require large commitments by the World Bank and other IFIs, and the 
willingness of Russia to cooperate with other external parties, including 
China and the EU. At the present time the prospects seem remote for 
achieving this obviously desirable objective. Yet the scale of tensions and 
potential humanitarian disasters arising from the absence of an effective 
strategic cooperation in this field seem certain to mount. Water flows into 
the dams of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are declining, as are the virtual 
water reservoirs represented by the glaciers of the Pamir mountains. Water 
levels in the major reservoirs of both countries have fallen so substantially 
that there are increasing fears that these levels could descend to the ‘dead 
level’ (i.e. at which electricity generation becomes no longer possible).30 
The conventional view of the IFIs is that progress over these vital 
projects is only conceivable if regional agreements could be reached 
between upstream and downstream states over the terms and conditions 
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for water discharge, with a strong foundation in international law. Yet the 
policy of the IFIs goes beyond the requirements of international law, which 
only calls for consultations with downstream states, not their mandatory 
agreement. A less stringent approach would call for the IFIs to go ahead 
with hydro investments in upstream Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan on 
conditions that would take account of a reasonable interpretation of 
downstream interests. The EU, with its very large representation on the 
board of the World Bank, could be an important voice and vote in favour of 
such an approach.  
However it would still be much preferable to advance on the basis of 
agreement between the upstream and downstream countries, given the 
serious risks of interstate conflict that could erupt. Given the difficulty the 
regional parties have in negotiating together, there is a case for a high-level 
diplomatic initiative, in which all major external parties (China, the EU, 
Russia, the US and the IFIs) would make a harmonised call for a 
cooperative solution, including the convening of a high-level conference to 
demonstrate the value of international agreements made in analogous 
situations elsewhere in the world. 
Steps to facilitate this process include the ‘Berlin Process’ initiated by 
the German Foreign Minister in April 2008, with action under four 
headings: a) facilitation of cross-border water management, b) increase in 
the scientific expertise in cross-border water management, c) networking of 
water experts from the EU, Central Asia and Germany and d) creation of a 
degree programme in water management at the German Kazakh 
University in Almaty. The programme is being undertaken between 2009 
and 2011 by GTZ with a budget of €10 million, in close cooperation with 
other regional and international partners. Action plans for regional 
institutional cooperation will aim at setting effective dispute settlement 
standards, the strengthening of cross-border river basin management 
through better dam coordination and the implementation of ‘fast-track 
projects’ such as the construction of smaller hydropower stations and 
irrigation plants.  
Concrete proposals could also be advanced for consortium 
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facilities, following a similar logic to that advanced above for the Ukraine 
gas transit pipeline.31  
In the meantime the latest news in February 2009 is that Russia has 
gone ahead bilaterally with Kyrgyzstan with a pledge of a loan of $1.7 
billion to invest in the Kambarata hydro project. This decision coincided 
with Kyrgyzstan’s announcement that the US should leave the Manas 
airbase, which is currently serving as an important supply base for the war 
n Afghanistan. These developments have geo-political overtones, contrary 
to the hypothesis intended for the present report.  
Conclusion: Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, cooperative management 
of the water, hydro-electric and irrigation resources of Central Asia has 
catastrophically broken down, resulting in growing humanitarian distress in 
upstream Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan through a lack of winter heating, and in 
downstream Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan through water shortages for 
agriculture. The resulting internal and intra-state tensions are growing and could 
lead to open conflicts. The alert is being sounded by international agencies, but 
with little effect. The EU cannot itself become the main architect of a solution, but 
it could help shape a coalition of all major actors to this end, and in particular use 
its considerable weight in the board of the World Bank for a more pro-active 
approach.  
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8.  CLIMATE CHANGE 
Search for a post-2012 climate change agreement  
The EU is playing a leading role in the current negotiations to agree a 
successor to the Kyoto Protocol for action after 2012. The 2007 Bali Action 
Plan launched a two-year negotiation process with a clear deadline for the 
agreed outcome on cooperation beyond 2012 — the end of the first 
commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol — to be reached in 
Copenhagen in December 2009. The Action Plan calls for articulating “a 
shared vision for long-term cooperative action” and identifies four key 
elements that are likely to be part of a post-2012 framework: mitigation, 
adaptation, finance and technology. While the Poznan conference in 2008 
was regarded as the halfway point, negotiations there did not result in a 
significant breakthrough. The EU has set its own target of greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emission reductions by 20% by 2020, which will be raised to 30% in 
the case of a wider international agreement; and called upon other 
developed countries, including the US, to follow their lead. In order to meet 
the EU objective of limiting the average global temperature rise to 2°C, the 
EU also suggested emissions reductions of 15-30% by 2020 by developing 
countries as a group, and especially what the Commission calls 
“economically advanced developing countries” or so-called ‘emerging 
economies’. These commitments, binding for developed countries and non-
binding for emerging economies, would make it possible to move towards 
a low-carbon economy in the coming decades.  
Major polluters in the category of ‘transition economies’, which 
include Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, may not have to adopt precisely 
the same obligations as developed countries, at least initially. The main 
concerns for these countries are: i) whether they would accept extending 
quantitative commitments for the next period when other emerging 
economies are strongly resisting to do so; ii) if so, what opportunities 
would arise from the continuation of existing tools such as Joint 
Implementation (JI) and trading of Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) or the 
introduction of innovative tools for the next period; and iii) how can 60 | CLIMATE CHANGE 
transitional economies also benefit from increasing access to technology 
and finance which are to date mainly considered to be incentives for 
emerging economies to participate in the post-2012 framework. 
The EU has already been helping Russia and Ukraine implement 
their compliance with the Kyoto Protocol. However this Kyoto phase has 
been almost a free ride for Russia and Ukraine, due to their reduction of 
CO2 emissions with the collapse of Soviet-era industries in the early 1990s. 
For the next post-Kyoto period the EU could aim at cooperating in more 
ambitious plans for the three major carbon emitters – Russia, Ukraine and 
Kazakhstan. All three are major coal producers and users, and will need 
new state-of-the-art technologies for the cleaner burning of coal and carbon 
capture (as also Poland in the EU). Given the commonalities of these former 
Soviet states, there would be much to be said in favour of a cooperative 
endeavour between the EU, which has the best technologies available, and 
these three major polluters together. They share in addition similar 
problems of grossly inefficient energy use in both industry and households. 
The EU, and Germany in particular, has been making efforts in this 
direction.  
The three major polluters  
Russia. Until the global financial crisis Russia was benefiting from high oil 
prices and significantly increased its gross domestic product (GDP). As 
living standards improved, the consumption of electricity increased.32 To 
meet increased demand, the old inefficient electricity generation capacity 
has been introduced again.33 Moreover, the government has promoted a 
long-term strategy for the large-scale replacement of natural gas by coal in 
power generation in order to maximise the gas export. 
Russia’s greenhouse gas emissions have peaked at 1990 levels 
(approximately 3,300 million tonnes CO2 equivalent, MtCO2-eq),34 for 
which the base year for the Kyoto Protocol target (stabilisation in 2008-12 at 
                                                      
32 A. Kokorin and I. Gritsevich, “The danger of climate change for Russia: Expected 
losses and recommendations”, Russian Analytical Digest, 23/07, DGO, Centre for 
East European Studies, Bremen, 2007.  
33 World Bank, “Energy Efficiency in Russia: Untapped Reserves”, September 2008. 
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1990 level) is set, experienced a fast decline in five years (1990-94) and a 
slow decline in the next five years (1994-98), and has recorded a gradual 
increase since 1999. In 2006 its GHG emissions are about 2,200 MtCO2-eq.35 
This is the reason why Russia wants to keep the base year of 1990 for 
setting commitments for the post-2012 period. It regards a proposed 50% 
cut of global GHG emissions by 2050 as an ‘aspirational goal’, and stated its 
opposition to setting ranges for mid-term targets (25-40% cut by 2020 from 
1990 levels) for it and other transition economies, noting that such mid-
term targets should be based on national initiatives. 
The Russian economy is characterised by a high share of energy-
intensive sectors such as electric-power industry, metallurgy of ferrous and 
non-ferrous metals, oil refinery, chemicals and petro-chemicals. Their share 
accounts for more than 55% of total industrial production of the country.36 
Potential energy savings are estimated on the order of 360 to 430 million 
tonnes coal equivalent (Mtce) per year, broken down as follows: fuel and 
energy complex 120-135 Mtce; industry and construction 110-140 Mtce; 
transport 25-30 Mtce; agriculture 12-15 Mtce; residential buildings and 
appliances 95-110 Mtce. 
The World Bank estimates that Russia can save 45% of its total 
primary energy consumption.37 Achieving the full potential of Russia’s 
energy efficiency would cost a total of $320 billion to the economy while 
saving about $80 billion per annum, which means paying back in only four 
years. Benefits to the total economy will amount to $120-150 billion per 
annum of energy cost savings.  
Energy efficiency remains at centre of an ongoing bilateral dialogue 
on energy between the EU and Russia in order to secure Russia as a reliable 
supplier of oil and natural gas. These two parties have developed the EU-
Russia Energy Dialogue since 2000, running three thematic groups, 
including one on energy strategies, forecasts and scenarios and another on 
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energy efficiency.38 Moreover, they launched the EU-Russia Energy 
Efficiency Initiative in 2006. Among others Russia appears to be interested 
in learning from the experience of the EU in addressing energy efficiency 
and energy savings in buildings, transport and electricity sectors.  
In the 2003 Energy Strategy to 2020, Russia set a target of a 45% 
reduction in energy intensity by 2020. Currently the Ministry of Energy 
(Minenergo) is elaborating the draft of a new version of the Energy Strategy 
for Russia for the period up to 2030. The priorities of the Russian long-term 
energy policy would include a reduction of energy consumption by 
improvements in energy efficiency and a large-scale decrease in specific 
energy intensity on the order of 2.6 to 2.7 times by 2030, and securing a 
near-1990 level of GHG emissions in 2030. Then in 2008 the Ministry of 
Economic Development and Trade (MEDT) announced a new strategy, the 
“Concept of long-term socio-economic development” for the period up to 
2020. In contrast to the Energy Strategy with its emphasis on the primary 
energy sources including oil, gas and coal, the development strategy calls 
for a shift to a more diversified economy, stressing the importance of high 
technology and innovation. Such a shift would contribute to GHG 
emissions reductions. As the Russian economy is particularly hit hard by 
the recent financial crisis and fall in oil prices, however, this economic 
forecast will have to be modified regarding GDP growth and energy 
consumption. Different ways of thinking across ministries described above 
would shadow the process of modifying scenarios under current economic 
circumstances.39 
In June 2008 the President signed a Decree on measures to increase 
energy and eco-efficiency of the Russian economy. It aims at no less than a 
40% cut in energy intensity per GDP unit by 2020 relative to 2007 and tasks 
                                                      
38 Op. cit., EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, 2008. In parallel, the EU-Russia 
Environmental Dialogue is underway, covering a number of environmental issues 
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39 The 2020 Concept can be seen as a document of intentions to elevate Russia to a 
global leader in energy and innovation without articulating how to get there. 
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the government to finish developing the action plan.40 It is expected that 
regardless of changes to the long-term scenarios and strategies, energy 
efficiency will remain crucial for Russia’s climate and energy policy in the 
short- to mid-term. 
One of the main challenges posed in the Energy Strategy to 2020 is 
coal. Coal accounted for 26% of energy-related CO2 emissions in Russia in 
2005, one-half that of natural gas (52%).41 The Energy Strategy projects a 
75% increase in coal production and its increasing share in electricity 
generation in order to allow for more natural gas exports that are 
profitable. If an increasing use of coal is inevitable, the second best would 
be to promote the use of modern, efficient and cleaner technologies. To 
promote such technologies, especially the most efficient EU Clean Coal 
Technologies, the EU has viewed Russia as a priority under the CARNOT 
programme, attracting four projects underway. One of them is a study for 
Integrated Gasification Combined-Cycle (IGCC) technology possibilities in 
the Russian power sector, leading to CO2 capture and hydrogen 
production. 
In climate change Russia has formally entered the mode of complete 
observance of commitments under the Kyoto Protocol since June 2008. A 
comprehensive action plan has been adopted for compliance with the 
treaty. Russia can benefit from two instruments authorised under the 
Protocol, Joint Implementation (JI) and trading of Assigned Amount Units 
(AAUs).  
Russia has achieved some progress in developing a legal framework 
for JI projects approval.42 Nevertheless, Russia’s JI project commission has 
not yet recommended the first project for approval.43  
Another tool for Russia to realise its mitigation potential under the 
Kyoto Protocol is trading of AAUs, especially through a Green Investment 
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41 Energy Information Administration, US. 
42 www.rusrec.ru 
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Scheme (GIS). The basic idea is to invest revenue from the sale of AAUs in 
projects that would lead to further emissions reductions. Russia’s National 
Strategy in GHG emissions reductions (1998-99) links AAUs trading to 
green investments.44 Despite an early expression of its own interest and 
support from the World Bank, Russia has been outpaced by other 
competitors with surplus AAUs, such as Hungary, Latvia, Ukraine and 
Romania in designing a GIS.45 
Ukraine. Ukraine’s GHG emissions also peaked at 1990 levels, the 
base year for the Kyoto Protocol target (stabilisation in 2008-12 at 1990 
levels). It has recorded a steady decline in emissions until 2000 and since 
then a gradual increase. In 2006 its GHG emissions were reduced to less 
than a half of the base year levels. Hence Ukraine also argues for keeping 
the base year as 1990 for long-term GHG emissions reduction targets. 
However, in contrast to Russia, Ukraine is more open to target-setting at 
the UN negotiations, indicating the possibility for common targets for GHG 
emissions reductions by 20% by 2020 and 50% by 2050.46  
The energy sector accounts for about 70% of Ukraine’s total national 
GHG emissions. Between 1980 and 2004, its energy intensity was higher 
than that of Russia. Moreover, its heavy dependence on coal (40% of 
energy-related CO2 emissions in 2004, next to natural gas 46%) makes the 
country high in carbon intensity. The government has introduced policies 
encouraging energy conservation and energy efficiency and passed a bill 
encouraging development of an alternative energy sector through tax 
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rebates for companies seeking to develop solar, geothermal and wind 
power projects.47 
Under the Kyoto Protocol Ukraine can benefit from both JI and AAU 
trading, ranked on top of the host country ratings. In its submission to the 
discussion on long-term cooperative action, the country suggests requiring 
Parties to fulfil commitments through ‘greening’ of carbon units.48 Ukraine 
completed a World Bank study for a GIS in 2006 and has made progress in 
preparing for its introduction, including the adoption of procedures.49 The 
country is also interested in a domestic emissions trading scheme, and 
participates as an observer in the International Carbon Action Partnership, 
an EU-led initiative for a platform linking domestic emissions trading 
schemes. The EU-Ukraine environmental dialogue has been upgraded and 
reactivated in 2006 from the bilateral working group on climate change 
initially launched in 2002.  
Kazakhstan.  While our information here is limited, Kazakhstan is 
ranked as the fourth most-GHG-intensive economy in the world. Coal 
accounts for 80% of the electricity production in the country.50 It is reported 
that the President has signed a law on ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, 
thereby completing the ratification procedure. The country has pledged to 
take voluntary quantitative commitments for GHG emission reductions 
during the commitment period from 2008 to 2012 relative to 1992 levels. 
Ratification will make the country eligible for hosting projects under JI 
(Joint Implementation). Potential projects could be identified in the oil and 
gas, energy, metallurgical and cement sectors.  
Scope for cooperation with the EU 
A number of bilateral and multilateral initiatives have been already taking 
in place. The EU and Russia have developed dialogues on energy and 
environment respectively, and sought to increase synergy between the 
tracks. Some EU member states have been active in investing in JI projects 
                                                      
47 Energy Information Administration, US. 
48 Ukraine, 2008, op. cit. 
49 O. Semkiv, “Recent GIS developments in Ukraine”, presentation in Budapest, 25 
April 2008. 
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in order to purchase credits for their compliance with the Kyoto Protocol. 
The World Bank and the UNDP have helped potential host countries 
prepare for the legislation, institutions and procedures that are needed for 
approval of such projects. With so much untapped potential for energy 
efficiency and savings, Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan would prove to be 
a testing ground for the ability of existing and innovative mechanisms to 
attract private investments that are urgently needed to upgrade key sectors 
of the economy. Such tools would enable them to achieve further GHG 
emissions reductions and pursue paths to a low-carbon economy. 
The EU could now propose a scheme to raise its climate change 
cooperation with Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan to a higher level with the 
following initiatives: 
1)  Invite Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan to join with the EU in a 
Quadripartite Climate Change Dialogue, given that the three post-
Soviet states inherit many similarities in the climate change 
challenges they face, with potential economies of scale in solutions, 
and given also that this is a matter of common interest with a non-
competitive logic (unlike so many other energy issues). This dialogue 
would provide leadership for identifying and getting political 
support for projects of common interest. In particular, the dialogue 
could contribute best practice in forecasting CO2 emission trajectories 
and mitigation potentials, aid compliance over their (limited) 
commitments under the Kyoto Protocol and measures to ensure 
access to helpful instruments (JI and AAU).  
2)  Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS). The EU has now begun to work 
in Denmark and Germany on the first pilot projects for validating 
new technology for the capture of carbon dioxide (CO2) from 
conventional power stations. A set of 10 such pilot projects are being 
supported by the EU. The EU could build on this experience by 
proposing to support CCS projects in third countries. For example 
there could be one CCS project in Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, 
with major economies of scale, and benefits to be derived from 
preparing these cooperatively together.  
3)  Emissions Trading Schemes (ETS). Although the three countries are 
unlikely to enter into binding quantitative commitments at 
Copenhagen, this does not and should not prevent them from 
developing key national policy instruments aimed at GHG emissions 
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countries advance in the introduction of ETS schemes, and prepare 
for their linkage between each other and ultimately with the EU ETS.  
4)  Energy efficiency programmes. This very conventional heading 
covers many of the most basic requirements for energy savings, such 
as household metering and thermostatic controls and improvements 
on hugely wasteful old industrial technologies in all these countries. 
Energy efficiency measures could be a win-win solution, bringing 
benefits through GHG emissions reductions as well as improvements 
in local air quality. There have been many programmes and projects 
supported by the EU and member states (notably Germany), but their 
scale and impact seem still to fall short of what is urgently needed 
and technologically straightforward.  
Conclusion: Three major countries – Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan – are 
all extremely heavy polluters, especially through the use of coal and obsolete 
energy-using technologies. They will resist inclusion in the group of developed 
countries making ambitious and binding quantitative commitments for the post-
2012 period. However the EU could propose a collaborative action with all three 
countries together, setting up a Quadripartite Climate Change Dialogue, leading 
on to collaborative projects for Carbon Capture and Storage pilot projects, aiding 
the development of national emission trading schemes, and amplification of 
conventional energy efficiency and saving programmes.  68 | 
 
9.  BORDER MANAGEMENT 
his section concerns border management and combating the 
trafficking of drugs, illegal migration and terrorism, which are of 
concern to the whole EU-Rus-EaP-CA area. For example drugs that 
mainly originate in Afghanistan transit through Central Asia and on into 
Europe through both southern routes through the Caucasus and Black Sea 
and northern routes through Russia. This is a relatively de-politicised 
subject, which should be open to increasingly deep cooperation between all 
parties.  
The EU is already significantly engaged in border control assistance 
programmes and projects with all three partners (Rus, EaP and CA). This 
includes cooperation between Europol and Russian agencies. A primary 
objective is to get greater leverage in Central Asia. The EU already 
substantially funds the Border Management Programme for Central Asia 
(BOMCA), which is implemented by the UNDP. In addition there is 
activity of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), which 
is sponsoring projects to train Central Asian government agencies to curb 
drug traffic. 
There are however serious challenges in organising effective 
cooperation between external assistance programmes and the host 
countries. In Central Asia, the Caucasus and Afghanistan, border 
authorities lack the experience and capacity needed to combat trafficking, 
illegal migration and terrorism across their borders. The strategic interests 
of the European Union are also at stake. Afghanistan’s lagging border 
control efforts have enabled the Taliban to stage a comeback in remote 
f r o n t i e r  a r e a s ,  a n d  u n d e r m i n e  U S  a n d  E U  e f f o r t s  t o  h e l p  r e b u i l d  t h e  
shattered state.  
Since the beginning of the 21st century, the European Union has made 
border management missions a part of its engagement with key regions. In 
the Caucasus, Central Asia and Afghanistan, the missions seek to enable 
states to perform basic elements of border management (see box below).  
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Basic elements of border management 
-  Staffing official crossings 
-  Policing unofficial crossings (green borders) 
-  Equipping border authorities 
-  Building border infrastructure 
-  Training and deploying customs officers, border police 
-  Defining the role of military units in border policing 
-  Drafting national border control policy 
-  Promoting cooperation across customs, police and the military 
-  Managing budgets of border control authorities 
-  Sharing information with foreign border control counterparts 
-  Harmonising border controls with neighbouring states 
-  Resolving incidents and preventing escalation 
Border management missions can present three benefits. First, to 
prevent illegal and threatening flows of drugs (etc.) from approaching EU 
borders, and thus to reduce the cost of policing the EU’s own external 
borders; second, to advance the European Union’s foreign policy visibility 
and bolster its presence in key states; and third, to enable closer 
cooperation with Russia, which shares the same drug trafficking, illegal 
migration, weapons trade and cross-border terrorism problems as the EU. 
The European Union should adopt a strategy to expand its border 
management missions while remaining mindful of complicating factors. 
Existing programmes reveal that it is difficult to teach states good border 
management. The process requires extended field presence, deep 
knowledge of the particular problems of host states, and efficient 
coordination with non-EU programmes. Future border management 
missions must build on the lessons learned by past initiatives. An 
additional complication is the lack of synergy between Commission 
programmes and national-level initiatives of EU member states. Many 
member states fund and sponsor bilateral border programmes abroad 
without coordination or deep consultation with the Commission.  
EU-Russian Cross-Border Cooperation 
In the sphere of border management, there have been two levels of 
cooperation with Russia. At the supra-national level, Brussels and Moscow 70 | BORDER MANAGEMENT 
have signed agreements and declared common interests in the fight against 
cross-border drug trafficking, illegal migration and drug terrorism. The 
most important ventures at this level are EUROPOL and FRONTEX. This 
cooperation is generally focused on the EU’s external borders with Russia 
and tends to combat flows transiting from Russia. The benefit for the 
European Union could be important but Russia’s willingness to cooperate 
seems half-hearted.  
At the member-state level, cooperation over cross-border issues is 
more substantive, particularly for states that enjoy relatively better 
relations with Russia. German-Russian relations benefit from formal and 
informal cooperation in matters of cross-border trafficking and migration. 
Finland, which shares a long border with Russia, sponsored the Northern 
Borders Initiative. Such cooperation may be fruitful but lacks coordination 
or common purpose with EU-level programmes. 
If cooperation along the Russian-EU border is limited, cooperation in 
matters of border management in Central Asia and the Caucasus is 
practically non-existent. One reason may be Moscow’s frosty attitude to the 
EU’s engagement in the Caucasus, Central Asia and Eastern Europe. Russia 
has tried to shut the European Union out of these regions in light of the 
latter’s interests in promoting political reform, forging energy partnerships 
that decrease dependence on Moscow, and resolving local conflicts. Even 
before the Russian-Georgian war, Moscow was particularly irked at the 
European Union for sending a border support team to Georgia that 
included the borders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in its mission. Russia 
has also displayed overt hostility to the OSCE, which was sometimes 
involved in training police and border authorities in Central Asia and the 
Caucasus.  
Nonetheless, Russia has deeply compatible interests with the 
European Union when it comes to border management issues in Central 
Asia and the Caucasus, and border management missions provide a rare 
opportunity to recalibrate a specific aspect of EU policy to engage Russia. 
Until recently Russia was a key player in border control in Central Asia and 
the Caucasus. For example, upon becoming independent in 1991, some 
Central Asian states retained Russian military units to assist in border 
control. The last Russian border guards peacefully left Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan in 2001, as the states deployed national border control forces. 
By re-involving Russia in regional border management assistance 
programmes, the European Union relieve strained ties and encourage 
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The EU’s Role in Border Management Missions 
The European Union has experience in funding and implementing border 
management missions in its periphery. It was critical in setting up 
functioning border services in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is currently 
funding the EUBAM mission around Transnistria, which reinforces the 
capacity of Moldovan and Ukrainian officials to carry out effective border 
and customs controls and border surveillance. The EU and its member 
states also have a high profile in border management assistance in Central 
Asia and Afghanistan alongside the United States, NATO and the United 
Nations (see box below). 
Border Management Assistance Sponsors in Eurasia and Afghanistan 
-  European Union, Commission (Policing and Border Missions) 
-  EU-member states (numerous initiatives) 
-  Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
-  United States (Department of Homeland Security, State Department, 
Department of Defense) 
-  North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
-  United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
-  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
-  Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) 
The Border Management Programme for Central Asia (BOMCA) is 
funded by the European Union and implemented by the United Nations 
Development Programme. Inaugurated in 2000, BOMCA aims to export 
sound border control practices, enhance the border control capacity of 
participating states and teach officials to implement border policies that 
balance security with openness. BOMCA runs a multi-phase project that 
targets the technical and professional needs of Central Asian border 
authorities. BOMCA provides border authorities with basic equipment – 
from refrigerators to binoculars – and assists in the creation of border-
crossing terminals. BOMCA also runs training programmes for border 
guards, encourages cross-border cooperation and promotes the adoption of 
integrated border management, which enables customs and border 
authorities to undertake operations jointly and more efficiently. BOMCA is 
in an advanced implementation phase, and its next goal is to assist Central 
Asian states to open high-volume trade corridors at select border crossings. 72 | BORDER MANAGEMENT 
EU-funded BOMCA is an outstanding and innovative project, in that 
it is a region-wide programme with offices in all five Central Asian states. It 
employs a core staff of officers and managers who are EU citizens with 
direct experience in border management and development assistance. Each 
office also employs Central Asian nationals who are border control experts. 
This allows BOMCA to have intimate knowledge of each state’s border 
control needs and enables it to liaise with Central Asian authorities. 
BOMCA has advanced its goals with a coordinated, region-wide strategy, 
and a multi-year budget of approximately €50 million.  
In Afghanistan, the European Union works alongside the United 
Nations, NATO and the United States to raise the capacity of border control 
and customs. Afghanistan’s serious border control deficiencies create 
alarming externalities in the broader Eurasian and Middle East regions. 
Most serious of these is the multi-billion euro cross-border transit of opiates 
and heroin that eventually make their way to the European Union.  
The European Union’s clearest involvement comes via the EUPOL 
and BOMBAF initiatives. Inaugurated in 2007, EUPOL Afghanistan aims to 
establish sustainable and effective civil policing arrangements to ensure 
appropriate interaction with the wider Afghan criminal justice system, 
including strategies for border management. The Border Management 
Programme for Badakhshan-Afghanistan (BOMBAF) is a European 
Commission-funded programme (UNDP implemented) focused on border 
management along the Afghan-Tajik border. Its budget (€5 million) 
supports a work plan that includes training border guards, provisioning 
border posts and encouraging community-based policing. Additionally EU 
member states participate in border management assistance bilaterally or 
through non-EU organisations. For example, Italian units under NATO 
command have provided extensive training of Afghan customs officers 
who will staff airports and border-crossing terminals. German police have 
also sponsored the training of Afghan border police. However, the 
programmes do not share information on progress and lessons learned and 
they do not report to the same agencies. Despite their direct and indirect 
EU ties, these initiatives lack common purpose and fail to pool their efforts. 
Although there are many difficulties associated with border 
management assistance, recent political and strategic changes provide new 
opportunities for future border management missions. In Afghanistan, 
NATO plans to retrench its security and state-building efforts to core cities 
and roads. This will lead to greater demand for border management 
missions and the EU is particularly well-suited to rise to the task. In the SYNERGIES VS. SPHERES OF INFLUENCE IN THE PAN-EUROPEAN SPACE | 73 
 
process, the EU may also be able to engage Iran, which is currently fighting 
a low-intensity drug war along its border with Afghanistan and is quietly 
looking for international assistance to enhance its border controls. In 
Central Asia, Turkmenistan is undergoing a careful political opening and is 
more willing to work with foreign governments, particularly those that 
provide technical assistance. Tajikistan has shown unprecedented interest 
in drug interdiction but lacks resources to implement efficient border 
controls.  
The Future of EU Border Management Missions  
While the BOMCA project in Central Asia is a highly positive example, it 
currently suffers from two limitations. First, its EU identity is very reduced 
since it is operated by the UNDP and carries the various symbols of UNDP 
identity. Second, it has not sought to bring in Russian participation. The 
following proposals seek to remedy these limitations and more generally to 
build up a more effective border management programme in Central Asia. 
The model could be further extended with a twin regional project in the 
South Caucasus (a ‘BOMSC’). 
An EU Regional Border Assistance Centre (RBAC): The EU would open 
this centre in a Central Asian capital city to serve as a coordinating hub for 
regional border management programmes, both EU and non-EU. The 
current programmes that directly and indirectly affect border management 
in Central Asia, the Caucasus and Afghanistan tend not to coordinate their 
activities or share information. The RBAC would promote coordination 
across border management missions, serve as a data repository and 
geographically map the missions and their activities. This would prevent 
duplication of effort and identify gaps in border assistance. Additionally, 
such a centre would serve as an early-warning detection mechanism for 
emerging security problems along borders and could propose response 
strategies.  
The RBAC could be set up with a five-year mandate and a budget of 
€50 million. The centre would have a core EU staff including a director, 
political officers, border control experts, information technology experts 
and a smaller core of local staff to assist in liaising with national 
governments. Russia’s participation would be encouraged, with reserved 
places for political officers and technical experts. The RBAC would enhance 
the profile of the EU by creating a visible on-the-ground presence. The 
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mission in the coming years. The centre would brand border management 
as a holistic EU activity rather than one that member states take 
individually. 
Many European Union member states deploy experts as Border 
Liaison Officers (BLOs) in border policing, customs enforcement and 
immigration policy. BLOs have played a useful role serving both as 
attachés at EU and member state diplomatic missions and in deployment to 
border ‘hot spots’. However these resources need to work in closer 
coordination and on a large scale. The RBAC would further serve as a 
coordination bureau for these national experts and provide links to non-EU 
border programmes funded by the United States and the United Nations. A 
sum of about €15 million could enable the deployment of a few dozen 
additional BLOs for short-to-medium term stints over the next five years.  
The RBAC could also oversee future EU border management 
initiatives in the Caucasus. Indeed, as EU-Russian tensions reduce, the 
Commission should consider replicating the BOMCA model with a twin 
regional project in the South Caucasus (a ‘BOMSC’). 
An EU Fund for Border Management Reform (FBMR). The EU would 
take the lead in constituting a fund, to which member states and close 
partners of the EU such as Norway and Switzerland might also contribute, 
to encourage the states of Central Asia, Afghanistan and the Caucasus to 
apply competitively for funds for programmes to build up their border 
control capabilities. In Central Asia the RBAC would be the coordinating 
centre. The fund would require applicant states to diagnose their border 
control problems and propose solutions to them. Applications for technical 
or training assistance would then be vetted by a committee convened at the 
RBAC.  
This fund should be designed to encourage Russia’s involvement in 
border management. Russia could both contribute to the fund and appoint 
Russian border control experts alongside EU experts to vet applications 
and disburse funds. Russia would also be eligible to submit capacity-
building projects for its southern borders.  
The RBAC and its projects would also seek to establish working 
cooperation with the border-related activities in Central Asia of the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), in which China has strategic 
interests in relation to its frontier with Central Asia.  
A five-year fund totalling €100 million could cover a range of small-
to-large border control projects across Central Asia, Afghanistan and the 
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Conclusion: The EU and member states are already active in the field of 
border management in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The challenges in Central 
Asia are especially daunting, being at the source of the drug trails from 
Afghanistan. The main EU efforts are in the UNDP-implemented BOMCA 
mission, which means lack of EU visibility and reduced strategic benefit. Proposals 
are made for the EU to establish regional border assistance centres in Central Asia 
and the Caucasus, with funds to amplify operations, and openings for Russia and 
third parties to join in.  76 | 
 
10. CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND CIVIL 
EMERGENCIES 
eparatist conflicts have been the most virulent source of tension in 
contemporary European affairs, with the post-conflict situation in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia now to be arranged, and peace 
settlements to be sought still for Transnistria and Nagorno Karabakh, and a 
conflict prevention action needed in Crimea. In all these cases there could 
be benefits to be achieved if Russia were willing to work in a sincerely 
cooperative spirit with the EU and the other post-Soviet states concerned. 
Transnistria has seen two model solutions. The Russian ‘Kozak 
memorandum’ of 2004 was a federative proposition with some quite 
standard constitutional features. But fatally it so overloaded the weight of 
Transnistrian representation that President Voronin refused to sign. Since 
2006 there has been a Voronin ‘package deal’ on the table (at least not in 
published form), whose main components are autonomy for Transnistria, 
confirmed neutrality, withdrawal of foreign troops and assured property 
rights in Transnistria (i.e. no re-privatisation). The negotiation format is 
most active at the level of bilaterals between Chisinau, Tiraspol and 
Moscow, with less activity so far in the 5+2 format (Russia, Ukraine, OSCE, 
EU, US + Moldova and Transnistria). Russia could rehabilitate its 
reputation considerably with a willingness to back a reasonable 
compromise. The EU should push forcefully for the 5+2 format to be the 
principal negotiating forum. It should do this with the aid of a high-level 
political representative for Moldova, with the professional support of the 
existing special representative, for example Aleksander Kwasniewski, 
former President of Poland.  
The post-war situation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is the subject 
of the Geneva talks on security arrangements and IDP (internally displaced 
persons) return issues, which began on 15 October 2008, with the 
participation of Russia, Georgia, EU, US, OSCE and UN. The non-
recognition of the independence of these two entities by any party except 
Russia has presented difficulties from the start. One scenario, in due course, 
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could see functional cooperation with both Abkhazia and South Ossetia by 
all parties, including the EU, but without formal recognition of these new 
de facto states. There will be political reluctance to grant even this degree of 
implicit partial recognition, given that it may be perceived as a concession 
to Russia, which provoked the war. On the other hand, Abkhazia (more 
than South Ossetia) does not want to become part of the Russian 
Federation, but rather wants to start to develop now as part of modern 
Europe. This objective should be met with an open EU position for 
economic relations and people contacts. A move by the EU to cooperate 
functionally with Abkhazia and South Ossetia without recognition could be 
reciprocated by Russia over Kosovo, with it moving to a position of 
abstention, rather than seeking constantly in UNSC meetings to block EU 
actions there.  
For Nagorno Karabakh there has been years of attempts by the 
OSCE-sponsored Minsk Group co-chairs (France, Russia, US) to mediate a 
settlement in Nagorno Karabakh, and several episodes where agreement 
seemed close at hand. The content of these proposed settlements has been 
kept secret, but elements seem to include cession by Armenia of the 
occupied territories surrounding NK, guaranteed transport corridors for 
both NK into Armenia and for Nakichevan into Azerbaijan-proper, and 
deferral of a final status agreement for NK. Ideas for settlement of the 
constitutional regime have included a special status for NK with links to 
both Armenia and Azerbaijan, which would be consistent with the 
province’s history over the centuries at the interface between Ottoman, 
Russian and Persian empires. NK could be open to the economies of both 
Armenia and Azerbaijan, with a provision for refugee return, notably to the 
former Azeri-majority town of Sushi.  
Russia and Turkey both now seek to take the initiative over NK 
unilaterally. President Medvedev hosted a meeting in Moscow in late 2008 
with both Armenian and Azeri leaders. Turkey for its part seems to be 
moving towards normalisation of its relations with Armenia, with a view to 
mediating also with Baku over Nagorno Karabakh. The process might start 
with an opening of the Turkish-Armenian frontier for normal trade and 
movement of people, the removal of remaining Armenian claims (e.g. 
implicit in its constitution) to its earlier territorial frontiers, and moves in 
favour of historic reconciliation. In a further step Turkey might try its hand 
at mediating a settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. The EU could 
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formula might see a reconfiguration of the Minsk Group to include Turkey 
with France’s role converted into an EU role. 
Finally on Crimea, whose destabilisation must be avoided. Russia’s 
intentions are suspect on account of numerous semi-official/unofficial 
speeches and activities by Russian nationalist elements, including mayor 
Luzhkov of Moscow, notably contesting the commitments under the 
Sebastopol Treaty of 1997 to withdraw the Russian Black Sea Fleet by 2017, 
and stirring up inter-ethnic tensions with the Tartar communities. Official 
Russian spokesmen confirm plans to evacuate Black Sea fleet to 
Novorossisk, and indication of progress in building the new base and a 
date for the move to begin would be a strong confidence-building measure. 
It would be further helpful for the Russian authorities to use their influence 
to cool down Russian nationalist activism that aggravates tensions in 
Crimea, and for the EU to urge Kiev to employ exemplary policies towards 
the non-Ukrainian nationalities (Russian and Tartar) in Crimea. These 
national minority issues could be subject to conflict prevention initiatives, 
which are relevant to the responsibilities of the OSCE High Commissioner 
for National Minorities. In addition there could be of initiatives of civil 
society organisations, to which the EU and/or member states might 
contribute, with European experts also usefully contributing as a neutral 
party between the Ukrainian and Russian interests. 
Civil emergencies 
Both the EU and Russia have invested in considerable capacities for 
emergency aid in the case of natural disasters bringing humanitarian 
distress. This is a non-controversial field in which there could be 
established a coordination framework bringing in also the Eastern partner 
states and Central Asia. Such a Pan-European Civil Emergencies Facility 
would develop operational procedures for common actions, and coordinate 
supply capabilities and logistics. 
Conclusion: The conflict resolution and prevention agenda in East European 
states is an obvious candidate in theory for EU-Russian collaboration, together 
with the interested third states directly concerned (in the South Caucasus, and 
cases of Transnistria and Crimea). Russia has however taken the view that the 
perpetuation of these conflicts was in its tactical geo-political interests, until and 
unless circumstances such as the August war with Georgia presented the 
opportunity for decisive ‘victory’. However this policy has contributed heavily to 
Russia’s poor reputation in European affairs. In the hypothesis of this paper Russia 
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resolution and prevention efforts, in which case there could be a remarkable turn 
around in favour of cooperative outcomes. A Pan-European Civil Emergencies 
Facility is also proposed.  80 | 
 
11. NETWORKS OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND 
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 
Network of Schools of Political Studies  
The ‘Schools of Political Studies’, sponsored by the Council of Europe with 
the financial support of the European Commission, aim to train the next 
generation of political, economic, social and cultural leaders in the 
countries in transition. The schools organise seminars and conferences on 
such themes as European integration, democracy, human rights, the rule of 
law and globalisation in which national and international experts take part. 
The first School of Political Studies was founded in Moscow in 1992, 
as a private initiative resolved to help the creation of a new Russian 
democratic political elite. The Moscow model proved so impressive that it 
was copied in many European transition countries, mainly those that were 
not candidates for accession to the EU. There are currently schools in 
Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and most south-
east European countries. A project to create a school in Belarus is under 
development. While the Moscow school was the pioneer, its operations 
have been made increasingly difficult during the years of the Putin 
presidency and the restrictive and intrusive NGO law introduced there a 
few years ago. The school has survived so far, still directed by Elena 
Nemirovskaya, and participates fully in the now substantial network. 
However its recent proposal of a major project to extend its activities in the 
regions of Russia was refused funding by the European Commission on 
grounds of insufficient budgetary resources.  
Each school is run by a director, appointed by a board to select 
candidates (about 40 per year), prepare study programmes and deal with 
the school’s financial and administrative management. The schools of 
political studies are national NGOs in their own countries. They operate in 
regional networks and organise regional activities, particularly in the 
Balkans and the Caucasus. The schools’ directors meet several times a year 
to coordinate their activities and exchange experience and good practice. SYNERGIES VS. SPHERES OF INFLUENCE IN THE PAN-EUROPEAN SPACE | 81 
 
Alumni associations have been set up by a majority of the schools, helping 
to maintain and develop professional and social ties. Among the schools’ 
alumni are many ministers, members of Parliament, local councillors, 
senior officials, magistrates, businessmen, journalists, etc. The schools’ 
study programme is run by the Directorate General of Democracy and 
Political Affairs of the Council of Europe, which encourages synergy 
between the schools and the Council of Europe’s activities in the countries 
involved in the programme. 
Since their foundation, each of the schools of political studies has 
participated in its annual Summer University in Strasbourg, focusing 
mainly on the European institutions. This major event brings together all 
participants of the schools of political studies (numbering around 600), 
with debate and reflection on common issues, and spaces created for 
bilateral and regional dialogue. Each year’s Summer University is 
dedicated to a particular topic, with plenary sessions gathering all of the 
participants, and thematic conferences grouping from 2 to 4 schools of 
political studies. Visits to the European Court of Human Rights are 
organised. 
In an effort to further enhance the visibility, growth and 
consolidation of the schools of political studies, the Council of Europe 
announced in 2008 the establishment of the European Association of the 
Schools of Political Studies. The Association will have no profit-making, 
political or religious purpose. It will be administered by a board of 
administration consisting of Council of Europe officials and the directors of 
several schools of political studies, to be elected for four years by the 
general assembly of members. 
The schools of political studies are a joint programme between the 
Council of Europe and the European Commission, which currently share 
50/50 the budget, with the Commission contributing currently €1.7 million 
for two years, with additional financial contribution made by member 
states. To exploit fully the potential of this family of schools there should be 
a larger sustained budget on the order of €4-5 million.  
Network of public policy think tanks (PASOS) 
The PASOS network was founded in 2004 at the initiative of the Open 
Society Institute (OSI) as an association of independent think tanks in 
Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Its headquarters are in 
Prague. It currently has 31 member institutes (see box below). PASOS 82 | NETWORKS OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 
members provide policy advice to the region's decision-makers and 
international organisations on issues such as democracy, rule of law, good 
governance, respect for and protection of human rights and economic and 
social development It has received support from the EU, UNDP, the UK 
(DFID), OSI and various other international foundations and national 
governments. PASOS has the classic goals of think tanks: to assist public 
policy-making through conferences, seminars, workshops and publications, 
to foster cooperation between network members, and to support research 
and analytical capacity of high quality. 
PASOS member organisations 
Russia 
Strategia - St. Petersburg Center for Humanities and Political Studies, St 
Petersburg, Russian Federation  
Eastern Europe 
Social Policy and Development Center (SPDC), Yerevan, Armenia  
Economic Research Center (ERC), Baku, Azerbaijan  
Center for Economic and Social Development (CESD), Baku, Azerbaijan  
Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), Tbilisi, Georgia  
Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development (CIPDD), Tbilisi, 
Georgia   
Institute for Public Policy (IPP), Chisinau, Moldova  
Institute for Development and Social Initiatives (IDIS “Viitorul”), Chisinau, 
Moldova  
Expert-Group, Chisinau, Moldova  
International Centre for Policy Studies (ICPS), Kyiv, Ukraine  
Central Asia 
Public Policy Research Center (PPRC), Almaty, Kazakhstan  
Center for Public Policy (CPP), Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan  
PASOS also has member organisations in Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Kosovo, Latvia, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, and Serbia.  
The enlargement of the EU has brought new dimensions to this task. 
The EU has moved to the borders of Ukraine, Belarus, Russia and Moldova. 
On the one hand this has resulted in a more marked division of transition 
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prospects for membership, and those who are excluded. On the other hand 
the think tanks of the new EU member states have both skills and 
motivation to work with their counterparts in Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia.  
The evident challenge is to build up this network with a critical mass 
of institutes and individuals of outstanding quality. This requires long-term 
investments in the education and professional development of scholars, 
policy analysts and communicators with first-class professional skills, and 
their linkage in a network of institutes which should include leading think 
tanks of the EU, especially in the new member states.  
The PASOS experience is so far only a beginning, since its funding is 
on a small scale, and it is heavily dependent on the Open Society Institute. 
The challenge now is to find the resources and leadership to develop the 
network more strongly, and to diversify the funding. Several US-based 
private international foundations have made exemplary contributions in 
this field. Apart from the OSI network there is the example of the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, which has been able to sustain a first-
class think tank centre in Moscow, despite the Putin regime’s serious 
harassment of such activities.  
The EU, its member states (e.g. the German political foundations), 
and various European private foundations (e.g. VW Stiftung, Compagnia 
di San Paolo, Swedish Jubileum fund) are active in this field, but without 
critical mass as of yet. These three European foundations have however 
begun to operate as a consortium in research activities on EU foreign and 
security policy, and support think tank activity also in the Balkans. The 
way ahead might be for the European Commission and a few seriously 
interested member states to propose to these foundations a collaborative 
project. Experience shows that this kind of politically sensitive activity 
should be led by independent private foundations, but the needed critical 
mass of funding requires also official support. For example a central 
coordinating institute should have a budget of around €3 million, and a 
network of a dozen institutes might receive core grants of about €1 million 
each, thus totalling around €15 million per annum.  
Network of Institutes and Schools of Public Administration 
(NISPAcee) 
The Network of Institutes and Schools of Public Administration in Central 
and Eastern Europe (NISPAcee) was established in 1994 in response to the 84 | NETWORKS OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 
needs that came to light with the immense political, economic, and social 
transformation in the Central and Eastern European region. These needs 
were interconnected to the role of the state and public administration 
throughout CEE and the former Soviet Union in the transition to a market 
economy, liberal, multi-party democracy and the rule of law.  
NISPAcee, with headquarters in Bratislava, is a nongovernmental, 
non-profit, professional membership organisation, whose members are 
educational, training and research institutions in the area of public 
administration and public policy from all formerly communist countries. 
At present more than 120 institutions from the region are NISPAcee 
members and almost 40 associate members from the EU and the US. The 
NISPAcee members represent the most important and influential 
institutions in the region, of which a selection is listed in the box below. In 
addition NISPAcee maintains a larger database of more than 1000 relevant 
institutions and 4000 individuals from the region.  
Network of Institutes and Schools of Public Administration in Central and 
Eastern Europe (NISPAcee) 
Russia: Northwestern Academy of Public Service, St. Petersburg 
Russian Academy of Public Administration, Moscow  
Siberian Academy of Public Administration, Novosibirsk (and 11 other 
institutes) 
Ukraine: Lviv Regional Institute of Public Administration, NAPA  
National Academy of Public Administration, Office of the President of 
Ukraine, Kyiv  
Odessa Regional Institute of Public Administration, NAPA  (and 4 other 
institutes) 
Belarus: Academy of Public Administration under the aegis of the President 
of the Republic of Belarus, Minsk  
Moldova: Academy of Public Administration, Chisinau  
Caucasus Countries 
Georgia: Georgian Institute of Public Affairs (and 3 other institutes) 
Armenia: Public Administration Academy of the Republic of Armenia (and 
2 other institutes) 
Azerbaijan:  Academy of Public Administration under President of 
Azerbaijan (and 1 other)  
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Central Asia 
Kyrgyzstan:  Academy of Management under the President of Kyrgyz 
Republic  
Kazakhstan: The Academy of Public Administration under the President of 
the Republic of Kazakhstan  
Tajikistan: Institute of Training of Civil Servants  
New Member States of the EU 
Bulgaria: Institute of Public Administration & European Integration (and 9 
other institutes) 
Czech Republic: Institute of State Administration, Ministry of the Interior of 
the Czech Republic (and 6 other institutes) 
Estonia: Estonian Public Service Academy (and 3 other institutes) 
Hungary:  Faculty of Public Administration, Corvinus University of 
Budapest (and 9 other institutes) 
Latvia: Latvian School of Public Administration (and 3 other institutes) 
Lithuania:  Lithuanian Institute of Public Administration  (and 8 other 
institutes) 
Romania: National Institute of Administration (and 11 other institutes) 
Slovakia:  Institute of Public Administration, Ministry of Interior  (and 6 
other institutes) 
Slovenia:  Administration Academy, Ministry of Public Administration of 
Slovenia (and 3 other institutes) 
Founders of NISPAcee stressed that countries in transition had 
common problems and international cooperation of academicians and 
practitioners could have a critical contribution to coping with these 
problems and shorten the time of transition. NISPAcee had emerged as a 
regional facility for the exchange of knowledge, experience and skills and 
as a cohesive force of efforts to cope with challenges in the field of public 
administration and it has become an essential facilitator in regional 
progress. The new EU member states have special capabilities to assist the 
less advanced transition countries, which NISPAcee can mobilise. 
NISPAcee is an integral part and an active partner in the increasing and 
intensive flow of ideas and human contacts between what is Europe by 
historical tradition and the new geopolitically defined larger Europe and 
Central Asia. Public administration has to increase and strengthen the use 
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An increasing diversity has emerged in the NISPAcee region in the 
progress of transition, with very different levels and paces of transition. 
Partly this is related to the differences in starting conditions in levels of 
development, but also varying readiness to overcome transition problems. 
It is also partly related to the changes in the eastern borderline of Europe. 
The task is to strengthen cooperation between the scholars and 
practitioners of the various countries, to create a common ground for 
cooperation and to provide a forum that might be interesting for and could 
serve the interest of all professionals engaged with problems of their own 
country and sub-regions.  
There is a need to upgrade core governmental capacities in all 
targeted countries to strengthen strategic thinking in government for 
making critical future-shaping choices and for understanding of 
advantages of wide-ranging cooperation at least in economic, political and 
security spheres. Several parallel streams of actions could be taken in order 
to achieve this core goal, namely: to prepare and utilise forward-looking 
studies as a policy compass; to build qualified strategy-oriented units at the 
central level of government; to develop specific programmes and courses at 
universities and in-service institutes to provide advanced professional 
training in strategic issues, public policy and administration; to upgrade 
citizenship preparation at high school and universities; to encourage public 
discussions and consultations among politicians, mass media 
commentators, academics and intellectuals, grass root activists, etc. on 
main national policy issues. 
The European Commission launched a project on an establishment of 
the Regional School of Public Administration – ReSPA for the Western 
Balkans in 2004, leading in January 2009 to its permanent location in 
Montenegro. NISPAcee could provide the basis for a similar institution for 
Eastern neighbour states, Russia and Central Asia.  
A full development of this programme would require a budget of 
about €5 million, compared to the current operations of NISPAcee costing 
€1 million. 
Conclusion: This set of three networks in the broad civil society and public 
policy field illustrates how it is possible to organise politically sensitive activity 
overarching the former Soviet bloc, from Eastern Europe to Central Asia. These 
networks are plausible candidates for stronger support by the EU, member states 
and European private international foundations. The sums suggested, totalling 
€25 million, for all three networks would mean a substantial increase on present 
funding, but these are not large sums in relation to total ENPI resources.  | 87  
 
12. PAN-EUROPEAN SECURITY ORDER 
resident Medvedev has been promoting the idea of a pan-European 
security treaty, including in speeches made in Berlin on 5 June 2008 
and again in more detail in Evian on 8 October. One could readily 
agree that the August 2008 war in Georgia signalled the breakdown of the 
European security order, and the need to avert any further such 
developments. Moreover the unresolved Transnistria and Nagorno 
Karabakh conflicts and simmering tensions in Crimea are all cases that are 
vulnerable to escalating tensions and possible violence.  
First, however, it is opportune to recall the content of the existing 
pan-European security treaty, the Helsinki Final Act of August 1975, 
negotiated with the Soviet Union, of which the OSCE is custodian. Since 
the end of the Soviet Union the OSCE (formerly CSCE) has seen its 
membership enlarge to include all former Soviet republics, including 
Central Asia. It is therefore constituted in line with the objectives of the 
present study. But the OSCE now functions at a low level of achievement. 
Should its founding principles be revisited? One might think so after over 
30 years. Is it obsolete?  
The Act's "Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between 
Participating States" enumerated the following 10 points: 
I.  Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty  
II.  Refraining from the threat or use of force  
III.  Inviolability of frontiers  
IV.  Territorial integrity of States  
V.  Peaceful settlement of disputes  
VI.  Non-intervention in internal affairs  
VII.  Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms  
VIII.  Equal rights and self-determination of peoples  
IX.  Co-operation among States  
X.  Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law 
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As a set of norms for international security relations, these old texts 
remain absolutely valid; not a word is out of date. What then does 
President Medvedev propose? His speeches contain no references to OSCE, 
although Russia participates now in diplomatic discussions on this topic in 
OSCE fora. Medvedev identified Russia’s priorities under five points in his 
Evian speech: 
1.  Political norms: respect for international law, sovereignty, territorial 
integrity, political independence of states. These largely conform with the 
Helsinki Final Act. However principle VII from Helsinki on human 
rights is omitted, while in the August war with Georgia Russia 
breached Helsinki principles III and IV.  
2.  Security norms: inadmissibility of use of force or threat of its use in 
international affairs, and a unified approach to conflict settlement and 
peacekeeping. This is also following the Helsinki Final Act, but in the 
war with Georgia, Russia was in breach of principle II restraining the 
use of force.  
3.  The guarantee of equal security and three ‘no’s’, namely:  
-  No ensuring one’s own security at the expense of others. This is unclear. 
How can one define whether a measure for one’s own security is 
at the expense of others? Is a defensive alliance at the expense of 
the security of another neighbour? The target of the language 
seems to be the US missile defence project. 
-  No allowing acts (by military alliances or coalitions) that undermine the 
unity of the common security space. This implies that the common 
space exists, which is hardly the case; or maybe it is referring to a 
common space that should be created, in which case its 
mechanisms need to be explicit. 
-  No development of military alliances that would threaten the security of 
other parties to the Treaty. This presumably targets NATO 
expansion, and maybe that of the EU if it became more of a 
military alliance.  
4.  No state or international organisation can have exclusive rights to 
maintaining peace and stability in Europe. This seems to be just a 
rhetorical statement, expressing resentment towards the US, NATO 
or the EU. 
5.  Establish basic arms control parameters and reasonable limits on military 
construction. Also needed are new cooperation procedures and mechanisms 
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heterogeneous rubrique seems first to be proposing a renegotiation of 
the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, and goes on to 
propose a new or improved non-proliferation regime. Cooperation 
over terrorism is already on the agenda of G8, OSCE and EU-Russia 
relations. Cooperation over drug trafficking is plausible, for example 
together with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in 
Central Asia in particular. 
To summarise, the Medvedev proposal assembles a menu of items 
which start with some norms extracted from the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, 
several of which were breached by Russia in the August war with Georgia, 
followed by some newly formulated pseudo-norms that obviously seek to 
stop NATO’s expansion, and ends with a set of conventional security topics 
that are already on the agenda of international organisations and bilateral 
EU or US-Russia relations.  
We will return to the NATO question in a moment, but we first look 
at reasons why the OSCE has not flourished and is not even mentioned by 
Medvedev. Within the OSCE itself there has been a debate in the last few 
years over its priorities, with Russia wanting to downplay work on 
democracy and election monitoring. But if it has to be like that within the 
OSCE, the result will be that the EU will do more on its own, for which it 
has the resources and experience. But this reallocation of tasks will only 
further weaken the only truly pan-European security organisation.  
Responses to the Medvedev proposals at OSCE meetings have been 
mixed, ranging from the Sarkozy proposal to hold a special OSCE Summit 
on the subject (which has not been agreed), to remarks that the existing 
security architecture should be used better (e.g. in Russia’s observance of 
OSCE principles and decisions), through to the ambiguous position of the 
new US administration.51 The EU seems not to have made any substantive 
statement on the subject, but many European countries at the last OSCE 
ministerial in December 2008 seemed to have stressed the need for a 
comprehensive view of security. It is nonetheless positive that diplomatic 
                                                      
51 At the EU-US summit meeting in Prague on 5 April 2009, President Obama 
called for eliminating the threat of nuclear war throughout the world and 
committed the United States to reducing its nuclear arsenal, yet said that the US 
missile defence system in the Czech Republic and Poland “will go ahead as long as 
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dialogue is now underway within OSCE on the Medvedev proposals, and 
for these to take place within the OSCE is in itself a confidence-improving 
step. 
To be fair to Russia, the EU is itself responsible for a large part of the 
OSCE’s political obsolescence and unwieldy procedures. OSCE has now 56 
member states, all in principle enjoying the same sovereign equality, from 
Andorra and the Vatican to Russia and the United States, but with the EU 
only present as an observer. Its meetings resemble a mini-UN General 
Assembly. The EU accounts for almost half of the seats around a very large 
table, to which may be added the tendency nowadays for most of non-EU 
Europe to align on the EU’s foreign and security policy declarations, with 
the result that the EU27 often becomes a 42-country bloc. The EU member 
states account for 70% of the OSCE’s budget. Is it not time now for the EU 
to contribute a serious rationalisation of its presence in the OSCE, given the 
advances of its foreign and security policies, and the needs that are now 
obvious in view of Europe’s dysfunctional security order?  
A first step would be for the EU to become a full member of OSCE, 
which together with the Lisbon Treaty innovations in the CFSP area, would 
be a catalyst for the EU member states to do better in arriving at common 
positions. Given the cumbersome workings of the OSCE at the level of all 
56 member states, a further step would be to test recourse to restricted core 
group meetings, for example on a tripartite basis (EU-RUS-US), or on a 
wider basis including other major countries such as Turkey and Ukraine. 
There have been some examples of this practice already in OSCE, but 
without being institutionalised. 
At a later stage, as and when there would have been some successful 
confidence-building episodes, there might be consideration of a more 
ambitious and structured reform measure, creating a ‘European Security 
Council’, following in some respects the model of the UN Security Council. 
A permanent European Security Council could consist of major states 
including for example Turkey and Ukraine beyond G8 members with the 
EU, with further rotating places such as one for the rest of non-EU Europe 
and one for Central Asia. Russia has in the past made proposals for 
something like a European Security Council, but these were interpreted, 
probably correctly, as seeking to acquire a veto power over European 
security matters, and were therefore never pursued. However the political 
role of such a body does not have to be formulated in such an obviously 
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We return now to Russia’s major demand for the European security 
architecture, that NATO should not press on with further enlargement into 
the post-Soviet space. A narrative deeply ingrained in the Russian political 
consciousness is that Gorbachev and Yeltsin were duped by the West over 
NATO enlargement, and that Kohl had given Gorbachev assurances that 
NATO would not be expanded to Russia’s frontiers in exchange for 
Gorbachev’s cooperation over German re-unification. Those supporting 
NATO’s further enlargement to include Ukraine and Georgia argue that 
any independent sovereign state in Europe has the right to apply for NATO 
membership, and no third party has the right to tell them otherwise. That is 
a serious argument, but it not the whole story. NATO membership involves 
the solemn commitment under Article 5 to take an attack on any member’s 
territory as an attack on all. The counterpart to this strategic commitment is 
that the aspiring member state has to be a reliable partner. It has to be 
solidly behind the alliance politically, with no doubts over the credibility of 
its own commitment. It has also to have demonstrated sustained reliability 
for sound political judgment on strategic matters in times of stress. These 
two criteria – national consensus and political reliability – might well be 
adopted more explicitly by NATO, rather like the EU adopted its 
Copenhagen criteria for its enlargement.  
Neither public opinion nor the political parties in Ukraine are 
anywhere near united on the NATO question. The criterion should be far 
more than majority parliamentary support, and essentially a national 
consensus. And Georgia, while united behind the wish to be protected by 
NATO, has demonstrated precisely the reverse of sober reliability in 
matters of strategic behaviour.  
These weaknesses were evident enough already before the Bucharest 
summit, which attached no timetable to its forecast that Georgia and 
Ukraine “will be” members of NATO, some day. The candidates’ lack of 
qualifications for NATO membership has become even more evident since 
then. NATO will surely not reverse its Bucharest declaration, but it could 
move to define its ‘Copenhagen criteria’.  
It would surely be best if some significant confidence-building 
measures could be set in motion alongside the general discussion of the 
Medvedev proposals. An example could be a genuinely cooperative move 
towards resolution of the Transnistria conflict, for which a 5+2 body (which 
includes the EU) has been set up in principle, but whose activation is being 
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much easier to initiate but still useful, as suggested by the recent start of tri-
lateral (German-Polish-Russian) consultations between foreign policy 
planning staffs, whose positive political symbolism is striking.  
In due course, as and when some confidence between Russia’s 
leadership and the West is restored, there could be a return to explore 
possibilities for improving the Russia-NATO relationship. It is a striking 
anomaly that during the eight years of the Putin presidency there were 
only two meetings at the summit level between NATO and Russia. The 
problem is again at least in part on the European side, whose numerous 
small states make for the unwieldy 26+1 format (becoming now 28+1 with 
the addition of Albania and Croatia and more to come) for NATO-Russia 
relations. To counter this one could innovate with a new G4 summit format 
for pan-European security affairs, bringing together Russia, the US, NATO 
represented by its secretary general, and the EU represented by its post-
Lisbon presidency and high representative. This G4 could be considered as 
an alternative or complement to the hypothesised OSCE European Security 
Council.  
Returning back to immediate practicalities, one may ask whether 
early results could flow in the event of a better personal chemistry between 
the next US President and the Russian leadership. Is it too late for the 
missile defence project to be made into a matter for operational 
cooperation, given that it is meant to address a common hypothetical threat 
from a rogue nuclear state, with Iran in mind in particular? A precise 
Russian argument is that the radar facilities to be installed in the Czech 
Republic could be used to track missiles launched from Russia, and so 
would alter the strategic balance of nuclear strike capabilities, and upset the 
(nuclear-strategic) logic of mutually assured destruction (M.A.D.). Is this 
so? If not, transparent consultations in good faith should dispel the 
concern. If it is so, then there is an issue for a next round of START talks. 
There is also the broader question of arms control, including for 
conventional weapons, raised in the Medvedev proposals. Initiation of 
procedures for negotiations could become a valuable confidence-building 
measure.  
Conclusion: Russia has proposed a new pan-European security architecture, 
which sounds promising at first sight, even if the credibility of Russia’s intentions 
have been undermined in the war with Georgia and its recognition of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia. While many of the details of President Medvedev’s proposals are 
unlikely to win widespread support, both the EU and NATO reflect on how to 
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might respond by taking two steps to reinforce OSCE, whose role remains entirely 
pertinent: first, for the EU to become a full member of OSCE, and second, more 
ambitiously at a later stage as and when confidence between the parties had been 
seriously improved, to propose consideration of a new European Security Council 
which would be for a core group of major players within OSCE.  94 | 
 
13. OTHER PAN-EUROPEAN 
MULTILATERALISM 
he existing pan-European regional-multilateral institutional 
infrastructure is quite significant, and should in principle play a 
significant part in any broad plan to enhance cooperation across this 
continental space. However politico-institutional limitations are often 
severe, as the following examples (in addition to that of the OSCE already 
discussed above) show. 
The Council of Europe should in principle play a valuable role in 
achieving convergence on European standards of democracy. It has been 
hindered in recent years by Russia’s ‘exceptionalism’, in objecting to 
political criticisms from the rest of Europe, and aggressively advocating its 
own (dubious) conception of ‘sovereign democracy’. However the EU has 
been increasing its cooperation with the Council of Europe, with funding of 
relatively low-profile but professional projects in the democracy/rule-of-
law/civil-society domains, bringing together all member states including 
Russia. It is notable that low-profile but professional projects in these 
domains are appreciated by Russian participants, marking a dichotomy 
between the aggressively assertive and divergent top-level political 
discourse, and willingness at the professional level to join in cooperative 
programmes. It is also positive that Russia has largely respected the 
judgements of the European Court of Human Rights, including a 
considerable number of highly sensitive cases involving plaintiffs from 
Chechnya where the court rules against the Russia government.  
Given Kazakhstan’s interest in developing its European connections, 
consideration could be given to devising a special cooperation agreement 
and programme between the Council of Europe and Kazakhstan.  
In the economic domain the EBRD has become a well established and 
respected institution. Its role has been changing as the EU’s new member 
states graduated out of the transition category, while its emphasis on 
operations in Rus-EaP-CA has correspondingly become more important. It 
is notable that the EBRD has found an important niche activity with which 
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Russia is comfortable and fully supportive. Russia sees the EBRD as an 
interesting partner not only for investment in Russia, but also for 
partnership with some of its own major investors in Eastern Europe. The 
logic here is that Russian investors are not really trusted to be free of 
political control, or for their methods of corporate governance, but these 
problems – actual or just perceived – could be eased if the EBRD took 
significant minority shareholdings in Russian investments in countries such 
as Poland or Ukraine. The case of the proposed Ukraine gas transit pipeline 
(as discussed above in section 6) could be a flagship example of such 
partnerships.  
The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) was intended to serve exactly the 
purposes of cooperation between EU-Rus-EaP-CA. The Treaty has got 
stuck over Russia’s non-ratification, and especially its refusal to agree the 
draft transit protocol, which would oblige pipeline operators to grant 
access to third-party suppliers of gas (e.g. for Turkmenistan gas to pass 
freely on normal commercial terms through Russian pipelines, thus 
undermining Gazprom’s monopolistic control power). In reaction to the 
January 2009 Ukrainian gas transit crisis, the Russian side declared that 
“the Energy Charter proved to be useless, despite Ukraine’s ratification of 
it”, to which the Ukrainian side replied that it was Russia that cut off 
supplies. The Russian side argues that it would like to see a more adequate 
legal order for energy transit in Europe, but is dismissive of the ECT. The 
Secretary-General of the ECT could only lament the failure by Russia and 
Ukraine to respect the principle of regular supplies, or to use dispute 
settlement procedures that the ECT already provides (see his statement in 
the box below).  
The question now posed is whether the Energy Charter Treaty, which 
has not been able to function to its full potential, could be modernised to 
bring it into the operational mainstream with the aid of some revisions and 
additional provisions, or be placed in some fresh institutional structure that 
would provide fuller satisfaction for the interests of all parties. The case in 
principle for its role in establishing a more adequate international legal 
order for energy trade, including the issue of transit, and investment in the 
Pan-European Space, and for supplying dispute resolution mechanisms, 
has been abundantly underlined by the recent events. New issues include 
the future of gas pricing, and in particular whether the gas price should be 
de-linked from the oil price, given the emergence and likely growing 
importance of a spot market price for LNG supplies.  96 | OTHER PAN-EUROPEAN MULTILATERALISM 
Statement of the Secretary General of the Energy Charter Secretariat on the 
Recent Developments in the Russia-Ukraine Gas Dispute 
Since 7 January 2009, no Russian gas is flowing at the entry and exit points 
of the Ukrainian system. For the first time in history, the Ukrainian gas 
transportation system, which is the largest gas transit system worldwide, is 
not providing any transit. 
It is worth reiterating that the principle of uninterrupted transit is one 
of the core principles of the Energy Charter. While Article 7(5) of the Energy 
Charter Treaty specifically requires member countries to "...secure 
established flows of Energy Materials and Products to, from or between the 
Areas of other contracting Parties"; Article 16 of the draft Transit Protocol 
requires each member state to take necessary measures "...to expeditiously 
restore the normal operation of such Transit" in case of interruption, 
reduction or stoppage of transit flows. 
The Secretary General urges all parties involved to focus their efforts 
on restoring full operation of gas transit via Ukraine and a speedy 
resumption of the established gas transit flows. In doing so, all parties 
involved should further ensure the necessary communication and 
cooperation between the system operators involved to restore the system. 
Furthermore, the parties involved should prevent the disputes of national or 
international contractual and legal claims to be a hindrance for dealing with 
issues of vital importance and settle these disputes at the appropriate time. 
Regarding the disputed transit issues, the Secretariat invites the 
parties involved to consider the conciliation procedure according to Article 
7(7) of the Energy Charter Treaty, which provides a forum to look for 
solutions of these issues between the parties to the dispute. The Secretary 
General has found the former President of the International Gas Union, 
George Verberg, also former CEO of the Dutch gas company Gasunie, 
available to lead such conciliation efforts. 
Source: Remarks by André Mernier, Secretary General of the Energy Charter 
Secretariat, 9 January 2009 (http://www.encharter.org). 
Among the key questions to be explored include how might the 
recent extreme gas price volatility, following the oil price with around half 
a year of time-lag, be reduced? Might there be introduced into long-term 
contracts a corridor of minimum and maximum prices for long-term 
supply contracts within which prices could fluctuate? Could the protracted 
negotiations over the transit protocol be concluded, with possibly some 
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apply within the EU (i.e. revisit the Regional Economic Integration 
Organisation clause)? Should the existing dispute settlement mechanisms 
be adapted in some way to make their use more likely, with the addition of 
an early warning mechanism that could be activated by the Energy Charter 
secretariat? Some of these ideas seem to be in circulation at least informally 
in energy policy circles. Perhaps there are grounds for a fresh round of 
negotiations in search of a balanced outcome that would make for a more 
effective regime for pan-European energy markets. 
The Black Sea Economic Cooperation organisation (BSEC) should in 
principle be able to work in favour of EaP-Rus-EU projects and policies of 
cooperation, with encouragement now from the EU which becomes an 
observer in the context of the Black Sea Synergy initiative. BSEC has an 
elaborate institutional structure, but its performance has been hindered by 
a lack of professional capacity in the permanent secretariat and the 
difficulty in achieving political consensus over significant decisions (with 
Russia often blocking proposals entailing operational constraints and 
commitments). For this reason the EU was careful not to grant BSEC any 
claims for exclusivity in developing its Black Sea Synergy programme.  
The UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) is the 
grandfather of all pan-European institutions, set up in 1947. It has steadily 
withered away in political significance, although it has continued to do 
some useful things of a highly technical character such as on customs and 
the transport/transit of goods. It is not plausible to look to UNECE for any 
new initiative of importance, given the development of the enlarged EU 
itself, its bilateral relationships and the other (mostly more recent) pan-
European organisations as discussed above.  
Conclusion: Several pan-European multilateral organisations should in 
principle be supporting cooperation between all parties. Of the existing 
organisations only the EBRD has established an important niche activity that all 
parties, including Russia, seem content to work with. On the other hand Russia 
seeks to marginalise or ignore other organisations that should be serving key 
functions (especially the Energy Charter Treaty and OSCE), while the BSEC and 
UNECE find it difficult to establish or build significant roles. However both the 
OSCE and BSEC could see their role in economic affairs enhanced by various of the 
proposals discussed in this paper. The recent gas crisis further poses the question 
whether some revision or enhancement of the Energy Charter Treaty could provide 
fuller satisfaction for the interests of all parties and thus help establish a more 
effective order in the pan-European energy domain and provide fuller satisfaction 
for the interests of all parties.  98 | 
 
14. THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL AND 
ECONOMIC CRISIS 
he exposure of Central and East European economies to the global 
crisis has dramatically increased in the last few weeks and months, 
as the gravity of the global crisis has deepened and the 
vulnerabilities of this wider European region have become more apparent. 
Exchange rate depreciations on the order of 35 to 50% have been seen 
already in Russia, Poland and Ukraine, three major economies with 
fundamentally different starting points. So far these depreciations could be 
seen more or less as warranted adjustments. However the risk of true 
financial crisis, and domino effect contagion between all countries of the 
region, is now evident, due to large exposure in these countries to hard 
currency debt while their own currencies have plunged. European banks 
such as Raiffeisen and other major actors, having initially been criticised for 
aggravating the situation by withdrawing funds from these countries, are 
now exposed to the huge debt default risks. The calls for a concerted 
European response are now being made, as evidenced by the mini-summit 
of the EU’s new member states of the region on 1 March, preceding the 
plenary EU summit the same day.  
The striking feature of the present situation for the purpose of this 
report is that Russia, in spite of its own difficulties, has rushed in with 
financial assistance to Belarus, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, following the IMF 
in Belarus and Ukraine. The EU led a major donor effort in favour of 
Georgia after the August war, but has not so far acted otherwise in 
response to the region’s financial crises, beyond supporting actions of the 
EBRD to recapitalise banks and of the IMF in supplying macro-financial 
aid.  
The question that is now posed is whether the EU and Russia should 
coordinate their actions in the region, in association with the IMF. As in the 
case of almost every other field of possible action reviewed in this report, 
the starting situation is characterised by stand-off or competition in the 
attitudes of Russia, whose leadership is making speeches about being 
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‘alone’ in their willingness to come to the help of its neighbours, in spite of 
its own difficulties. The EU has since the 1990s become accustomed to co-
funding macro-financial assistance to countries in its neighbourhood with 
the IMF and to some extent also the World Bank. The EU has let the IMF 
and World Bank often take the lead in defining the conditionalities. It 
would not be difficult technically for Russia to join the process in a similar 
manner.  
Could the gravity of the present crisis become instrumental in 
engineering a change in Russian willingness to enter into truly cooperative 
actions? Russia will want to have its loans reimbursed. It will also want to 
avoid a spectacle of economic collapse around its borders, with the 
manifest risk of domino effects between countries, not excluding Russia. At 
a very recent public conference in Brussels, both Commission officials and a 
Russian ambassador were heard agreeing that there absolutely had to be 
coordination. Could this even become the tipping point for a re-assessment 
of Russian willingness to enter into deeper regional cooperation with the 
EU, Eastern Europe and Central Asia? The preceding sections of this report 
have drawn up a long list of important conceivable cooperative actions, 
offering in principle important synergetic benefits; yet in almost every case 
there is resistance on the part of Russia based on a competitive logic 
seeking to reconstruct a sphere of influence; and resistance by countries 
such as Ukraine which deeply distrust Russia.  
Conclusion: The deepening financial and economic crisis in Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia now sees Russia rushing in with financial aid to several 
countries of the region, alongside interventions by the IMF, and with the new 
member states of the EU calling for a more active response by the EU in favour of 
both themselves and neighbouring non-member states. The case for coordinated 
responses, including conditionalities, is manifest to avoid inconsistent actions and 
secure synergetic benefits. Such coordination between Russia on the one hand, and 
the IMF, EU and the countries concerned on the other, is not yet happening. But 
perhaps initiatives along these lines could, with some bold political leadership, be 
engineered; even more tantalising is the idea that this could become the tipping 
point to set in motion a change of strategic attitudes and thence a cascade of other 
cooperative actions of the kinds outlined in earlier sections of this report. 